Qubilai took a Chinese name in 1271 — China kept his provinces
The Mongol conquest of China is usually told as the conquerors' absorption: the khans became emperors, and China swallowed them as it swallowed everyone. Qubilai did take the Chinese imperial forms, deliberately and on the advice of Chinese men. But inside the shell of a Chinese dynasty he built a government that ranked its subjects by people, governed through Mongol overseers, wrote its edicts in a Tibetan-designed script and registered families by hereditary trade. The next three Chinese states kept its provinces, its capital, its household registers and its examination curriculum. The bill was paid first by the north, then by the south, and then by everyone who ranked last.
On 18 December 1271 Qubilai, grandson of Chinggis Khan, proclaimed that his state would henceforth be called Da Yuan, a name taken from the opening of the Book of Changes. It was the most Chinese gesture a Mongol ruler ever made, and on the same day he abolished the Chinese law code the north had lived under for seventy years. Behind the name stood a conquest that had cut north China's registered population by nine-tenths and would end the Song at sea in 1279. Inside it stood a government of Mongol overseers, ranked peoples and hereditary household registers, with branch secretariats that became China's provinces and a capital that became Beijing. China is said to have absorbed the Mongols. This record follows what the Mongols left inside China, and what it cost.
Before: two Chinese states and a steppe that had no government (1200–1234)
In 1207 the Jurchen Jin dynasty, which ruled the North China Plain from its capital at Zhongdu on the site of modern Beijing, counted its subjects and wrote the result into the record: 7,684,438 households and 45,816,079 people 1. South of the Huai River, the Southern Song governed a larger and richer population from Hangzhou. Ho Ping-ti's estimate of 1970, still the starting point for the demography, put the two states together at more than a hundred million people around 1200 2. Neither state was weak in the way later legend makes it. Both were bureaucratic empires that measured land, registered households, ran granaries and collected tax through layers of written procedure. Both recruited a large part of their officialdom by written examination. And both thought of themselves as the legitimate holder of a single Chinese imperial tradition that the other was usurping.
The Mongols, in the same year, had no state in this sense at all. Temüjin had been proclaimed Chinggis Khan at a gathering on the Onon River in 1206. He had an army, a household guard, a set of rulings and a script borrowed from the Uyghurs. He did not have a treasury, a land register, a tax schedule or anyone who knew how to make one. This record is about how, within sixty-five years, his grandson came to rule both Chinese states from a Chinese-plan capital under a Chinese dynastic name, and about what that grandson's government put into the Chinese state that was not Chinese and never left it.
The Song state: a government of examined men
The Southern Song bureaucracy was the most systematic civil administration then operating anywhere. Its officials were ranked in a single graded hierarchy, rotated between posts to stop them building local power, audited by a censorate and paid in a mix of cash, grain and paper. A large share of its senior officials had passed the triennial jinshi examination, and the examination's prestige had shaped an entire social class, the shi, educated men who might never hold office but whose families organised their lives around the possibility 3.
That class had, by 1200, an intellectual programme of its own. Zhu Xi, who died in 1200, had re-edited the Confucian canon around four short texts, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, the Analects and the Mencius, and written the commentaries that made them a curriculum. Under the Song his school was at different moments proscribed and patronised; it was not yet the examination's official reading 4. The Song state, in other words, had a bureaucratic machine, a class that staffed it, and a doctrine waiting to be adopted. The Mongol century would separate those three things and then put them back together in a different order.
The Jin north: a conquest dynasty in a Chinese frame
The Jin themselves had been conquerors. Jurchen armies from Manchuria had taken Kaifeng from the Song in 1127, carried two Song emperors north into captivity and pushed the Song court south of the Huai. The Jin then did what conquest dynasties in north China had done since the fourth century: they kept their own military organisation, the meng'an mouke units of Jurchen households, and governed their Chinese subjects through Chinese institutions. They held examinations, issued a Chinese law code, the Taihe code of 1201, and wrote their state papers in Chinese as well as in a Jurchen script devised for the purpose 5.
Two consequences of the Jin experiment matter for what followed.
- It produced a trained administrative class in the north that had already served a non-Chinese dynasty. When the Mongols arrived, the men who knew how to run the Jin prefectures were Chinese, Khitan and Jurchen literati with a century of practice in exactly this arrangement.
- It left a legal and fiscal apparatus intact enough to be captured. The Jin registers, the Taihe code, the paper-money offices and the examination system were all still there when the Mongol armies crossed the Great Wall in 1211.
- It left the question of legitimacy open. The Jin had argued for a century, in court debates that Hok-lam Chan reconstructed in 1984, about which cosmic phase their dynasty occupied and whose mandate it continued 6. A non-Chinese dynasty claiming the Mandate of Heaven was a problem the north had already worked through once.
What the Mongols had instead
What the Mongols brought into China in 1211 was formidable and almost entirely military 7:
- A decimal army, organised in tens, hundreds, thousands and ten-thousands that cut across tribal loyalties by design.
- The keshig, the imperial guard, which was both a bodyguard and a staff college.
- A policy of capture: craftsmen, engineers, interpreters and scribes taken into service wherever they were found.
- The appanage: conquered territory apportioned among members of the imperial lineage, and its people treated as the shared property of the house of Chinggis.
What they did not bring was any procedure for taxing settled farmers. The steppe economy ran on herds, tribute and plunder. The Yuan dynastic history records the moment this gap nearly decided the fate of north China. In the 1230s, under Chinggis's successor Ögödei, an official named Biedie advised that "the Han people are of no use to the state; they can all be cleared out and the land made pasture" (漢人無補於國,可悉空其人以為牧地). The Khitan secretary Yelü Chuzai answered with arithmetic: taxed properly, the north would yield five hundred thousand ounces of silver, eighty thousand bolts of silk and over four hundred thousand piculs of grain a year 8. Ögödei let him try. Ten tax offices were set up, staffed by literati, and the money came in 8. The atlas's record of the Ilkhanate tells the same story in Iran a generation later: a Mongol prince was shown a ledger, and the ledger won.
That is where the transmission begins: not with a Mongol admiring Chinese civilisation, but with a Mongol court persuaded, against a serious argument for depopulation, that a Chinese bureaucracy was the most efficient machine for extracting revenue from the land it had conquered.
The transmission: from Kaiping to the edict of 1271
A Khitan secretary and one examination (1237–1238)
Yelü Chuzai did not stop at taxes. In the eighth month of Ögödei's ninth year, 1237, he asked that scholars be selected "by Confucian learning" (請用儒術選士), and in 1238, a wuxu year in the sixty-year cycle, examinations were held across the circuits of the north in three subjects. Among those who passed was Yang Huan of Dongping. The Yuan dynastic history then records the result in four characters: 事復中止, "the matter was again halted" 8. There would not be another examination for seventy-seven years.
The episode sets the pattern of the whole century. A Mongol ruler could be persuaded that a Chinese institution was useful. He could not easily be persuaded that it was necessary, and the institution survived only as long as its usefulness was being argued by someone close to him. Yelü Chuzai lost influence after Ögödei's death in 1241 and died in 1244. Under Güyük and Möngke the north was governed through Central Asian tax-farmers and Mongol commanders, and the literati who had passed in 1238 waited 9.
Qubilai's Chinese circle (1240s–1259)
The man who changed that was Möngke's younger brother Qubilai, who from the 1240s kept around him the most deliberately assembled group of Chinese advisers any Mongol prince ever had. Morris Rossabi's biography, still the standard account, follows them one by one 10:
- Liu Bingzhong (1216–1274), a former Chan Buddhist monk, astronomer and geomancer, who would plan both of Qubilai's capitals.
- Yao Shu (1201–1278), a Confucian scholar who introduced Neo-Confucian teaching into the Mongol north.
- Xu Heng (1209–1281), the leading northern exponent of Zhu Xi's teaching and later head of the state academy.
- Zhang Wenqian and Wang E, administrators and drafters who would write the founding documents of the new regime.
- Hao Jing, an envoy and memorialist who spent sixteen years detained by the Song.
Elizabeth Endicott-West names Liu Bingzhong, Wang E, Yao Shu and Xu Heng as the core of the group that designed the Yuan offices 11. The case they made to Qubilai was put most bluntly by Xu Heng in his memorial on five urgent matters: 「考之前代,北方之有中夏者,必行漢法乃可長久。」 — "Examining former ages, those from the north who held the Central Plain endured only if they practised Han law" 8. Hanfa, Han law, here does not mean a legal code. It means the whole Chinese method of government: the bureaucracy, the registers, the rites, the examinations, the Mandate. The argument was historical and it was a warning. The Xianbei Wei, the Khitan Liao and the Jurchen Jin were the precedents, and the precedents said that conquerors who governed China by steppe methods did not last.
1260–1262: a reign title, a secretariat and a rebellion
When Möngke died in 1259 on campaign in Sichuan, Qubilai was in the field against the Song. He hurried north and, in the third month of 1260, at his summer residence at Kaiping on the edge of the steppe, accepted the throne after the ritual three refusals 8. His younger brother Ariq Böke was proclaimed khan at Karakorum by a rival assembly the same year. The civil war that followed lasted until 1264, and it explains much of what Qubilai did next. Ariq Böke held the Mongol heartland. Qubilai held north China. His claim rested on the resources of the sedentary south, and on a government that could deliver them.
Within weeks he gave it one. The Yuan dynastic history records the steps in order 8:
| Date (lunar, 1260) | Act | Chinese form adopted |
|---|---|---|
| 3rd month | Enthronement at Kaiping | Accession as huangdi, emperor, after three refusals |
| 4th month | 立中書省, the Central Secretariat established | Wang Wentong and Zhang Wenqian as its first ministers |
| 5th month | 建元中統, the reign title Zhongtong, "Central Rule" | Era name; the edict invokes the qianyuan of the Book of Changes |
| 10th month | Zhongtong yuanbao chao notes issued | Paper money: two strings to one ounce of silver |
Herbert Franke, whose 1978 study of Yuan legitimation remains the fullest account, identified Wang E as the drafter of the reign-title edict and noted that its phrase 體大易之乾元, "embodying the qianyuan of the Great Changes", already pointed at the dynastic name that would come eleven years later 12. The paper money was not new in kind. The Song and Jin had both issued notes. What was new was the scale of the ambition: a single note issue, pegged to silver by decree, for the whole of a conquered empire 8.
In the second month of 1262 the Chinese commander Li Tan, who governed much of Shandong as a semi-independent warlord, rose in revolt and offered his allegiance to the Song. The rebellion was crushed within months. Then the Central Secretariat's chief minister, Wang Wentong, was executed for having conspired with him: Wang was Li Tan's father-in-law 8. Rossabi dates from this moment Qubilai's lasting reluctance to give northern Chinese independent military command or unsupervised civil authority 13. The Chinese form stayed. The Chinese at its head were watched.
The offices that were not Chinese at all (1263–1269)
Over the next decade the government acquired its full shape, and much of that shape was new. The Yuan treatise on officialdom records that Liu Bingzhong and Xu Heng designed the structure — the Central Secretariat for civil affairs, the Bureau of Military Affairs, the Censorate, and outside the capital the branch secretariats — and states the rule that governed its staffing: 「其長則蒙古人為之,而漢人、南人貳焉」, "their heads were Mongols, and Han and southerners served as their deputies" 8.
Three institutions from these years show how far the government departed from any Chinese model.
- The Censorate, established in the seventh month of 1268 with the Mongol noble Tachar as its head, had a Chinese name and a Chinese function: surveillance of officials. Its head was a Mongol of the imperial clan 8.
- The new script. In 1260 Qubilai made the Tibetan lama 'Phags-pa his State Preceptor and ordered him to devise a "new Mongol script". In the second month of 1269 it was promulgated across the empire with the instruction that "all sealed documents sent down shall use the new Mongol script, each accompanied by its own country's script" (凡有璽書頒降者,並用蒙古新字,仍各以其國字副之) 8. Chinese was demoted to a gloss.
- The Tibetan Buddhist bureau. A Bureau of General Regulation under the State Preceptor, renamed the Xuanzheng yuan in 1288, was given charge of "the Buddhist clergy and the territory of Tibet" (掌釋教僧徒及吐蕃之境) 8. A Chinese government department now administered a foreign country through a foreign church.

The 'Phags-pa script never displaced Chinese characters in ordinary use, and it died with the dynasty. It survives on seals, coins, edicts carved in stone and on paiza, the iron and silver tablets that authorised their bearers to use the imperial relay stations and requisition horses and lodging. A paiza was the Mongol empire in the hand: a written command in a Mongol script, invented by a Tibetan, obeyed in Chinese post stations.
18 December 1271: a name from the Book of Changes
On the yihai day of the eleventh month of the eighth year of Zhiyuan, 18 December 1271 in the Western calendar, the Yuan dynastic history records two acts in a single line: 「禁行金泰和律。建國號曰大元」, "the Jin Taihe code was prohibited. The dynastic name was established as Da Yuan" 8. On the same day that Qubilai adopted the most Chinese of all imperial forms, a dynastic name claiming the Mandate of Heaven, he abolished the Chinese law code the north had lived under for seventy years. No replacement code was ever promulgated. The Yuan governed by accumulated precedent and edict, collected in compilations such as the Yuan dianzhang, for the rest of its existence.
The name itself was a novelty. Every earlier dynasty had taken its name from a territory or a fief: Qin, Han, Tang, Song, Jin. Da Yuan was taken from the opening of the Book of Changes, 大哉乾元, "Great is the originating power of Qian". The edict that announced it said so, and said why. Earlier dynasties, it argued, had named themselves by habit and convenience: 「為秦為漢者,著從初起之地名;曰隋曰唐者,因即所封之爵邑」, "those who became Qin or Han displayed the names of the lands where they first arose; those called Sui or Tang took the fiefs they had been granted". A state whose founder had "grasped the talisman of Qian and risen in the northern land" and whose maps were wider "than any in all antiquity" needed a better name: 「可建國號曰大元,蓋取易經『乾元』之義」, "let the dynastic name be Da Yuan, taking the meaning of qianyuan in the Book of Changes" 8. Franke put the novelty precisely: "It was the first time that a dynastic name in Chinese history was not chosen among territorial or geographic names but selected from a classic text after much philosophical speculation" 12. The edict was drafted, on Franke's account, by the Jurchen scholar Tudan Gonglü, and the proposal came from Liu Bingzhong, whose biography credits him with memorialising both the name Da Yuan and the elevation of Zhongdu to Dadu, the Great Capital 8.
Dadu was already under construction. In 1267 Liu Bingzhong had been ordered to build the new city wall, temples and palaces beside the ruins of the Jin capital 8. Its plan, a rectangle with the palace in the south-centre, the ancestral temple to the east, the altars of soil and grain to the west and the markets to the north, seems, in Franke's cautious phrase, to have been "modelled on" the Kaogongji, the ritual city-plan of the classical Rites of Zhou 12. Few Chinese capitals had ever followed the book so closely. It took a Mongol to do it.
The paradox was intended. The name and the city spoke to Chinese subjects in their own most authoritative language. They did not commit the Mongol ruler to anything. Qubilai addressed at least four audiences at once:
- To his Chinese subjects he was huangdi, emperor, holder of the Mandate, with a reign title, a dynastic name and an ancestral temple.
- To the Mongols he was khaghan, the elected successor of Chinggis, whose legitimacy came from the assembly and the lineage.
- To his Tibetan preceptors he was a chakravartin, a Buddhist universal monarch, consecrated by 'Phags-pa.
- To the other Chinggisid houses, from Tabriz to the Volga, he was the senior member of a family empire whose other branches did not accept his rule.
Franke's argument was that the legitimation was built for several audiences at once, and that sinicisation, "the gradually and never fully achieved sinicisation of the Mongol rulers", was one strand of it and not the whole 12.
What changed and what was replaced
A Chinese shell with Mongol rooms
The commonest single sentence about the Yuan is that the Mongols were absorbed by China. Elizabeth Endicott-West, in the chapter on Yuan government in the Cambridge History of China, put the problem with that sentence directly: "The official terminology of Yüan bureaucracy might lead to the conclusion that Khubilai merely adopted an almost purely Chinese structure of government, but in fact, the Yüan bureaucracy consisted of a mixture of different political and cultural elements" 11. Frederick Mote, in the same volume, was harsher. The Chinese forms, he wrote, "gave an appropriate mask to, but did not conceal, the fact that the Mongols had come into China to enrich themselves and sustain their military empire beyond China" 4.
The mixture is easiest to see office by office:
| Office or practice | Chinese name | What was Mongol about it |
|---|---|---|
| Central Secretariat | 中書省 zhongshu sheng | Headed in principle by the heir apparent; senior posts reserved for Mongols, with Han and southerners as deputies 8 |
| Prefectural overseer | 達魯花赤 darughachi | A Mongol or Semu official set beside every Chinese magistrate, with authority over him; the subject of Endicott-West's monograph on local rule 14 |
| Censorate | 御史臺 yushi tai | Chinese surveillance office, headed from 1268 by a Mongol of the imperial clan 8 |
| Branch secretariat | 行中書省 xing zhongshu sheng | A detachment of the central government sent to govern a conquered region, at first mobile and military |
| Bureau of Buddhist and Tibetan affairs | 宣政院 xuanzheng yuan | A Chinese-style ministry run under a Tibetan State Preceptor, governing a foreign country 8 |
| Household registration | 諸色戶計 zhuse huji | People registered by hereditary occupation (soldier, artisan, salt-maker, Confucian, physician, monk) and owing the service of that category for ever |
| Official script | 蒙古新字, the 'Phags-pa script | Mandatory on sealed documents from 1269, with Chinese as the gloss 8 |
Not one of these rows is purely Chinese and not one is purely Mongol. The darughachi had steppe origins as a resident commissioner over subject peoples. The occupational registers drew on both Mongol practices for assigning captured populations to service and on older Chinese categories, but the Yuan made them hereditary and universal. The branch secretariat was a Chinese title on a Mongol practice of governing conquered territory through a detached command. T. H. Barrett, reviewing Rossabi's biography in 1988, caught the Chinese historians' view of the arrangement: Qubilai "did for a while employ some Chinese advisers, northerners accustomed to serving alien overlords", and they were praised for it in a "somewhat backhanded" way 15.
Four kinds of people
The rule recorded in the treatise on officialdom, that Mongols headed offices and Han and southerners served as their deputies, rested on a ranking of the empire's subjects that later historians summarised as four classes 8:
- Mongols, the conquering people and their allied steppe tribes.
- Semu (色目, "various kinds"), Central and West Asians: Uyghurs, Tanguts, Persians, Arabs, Qipchaqs, Alans and others, used as administrators, tax officials and soldiers.
- Hanren (漢人), the population of the former Jin north, including Khitans, Jurchens and Koreans as well as northern Chinese.
- Nanren (南人), the subjects of the former Southern Song, conquered last and trusted least.
How formal the ranking was is genuinely disputed. The categories appear in examination rules, in appointment practice and in criminal law, but no single statute sets out four classes and their privileges. The Japanese historian Funada Yoshiyuki argued in 1999 that Semu was not a Mongol legal category at all but a Chinese term for the peoples "who did not apply to Han-fa (漢法); i.e. Chinese law", and that "this character of 'Se-mu' forces us to reconsider the accepted theory of 'the four class system'" 16. Sugiyama Masaaki's work, in Japanese, goes further and reads the Yuan less as a Chinese dynasty than as the senior ulus of a Mongol world empire, in which a Chinese-facing administration was one of several faces 1718. The scholarly position that emerges is that the ranking was real in its effects and improvised in its form: a set of practices about who could hold which job and who could carry a weapon, rather than a caste code.
What is not disputed is who came last. The southern Chinese were the great majority of the empire's taxpayers and the smallest share of its officials.
The examination: abolished by neglect, restored as orthodoxy
For seventy-seven years after 1238 there was no examination. The Song road into government, which had shaped the aspirations of the educated class for three centuries, simply closed. Officials were recruited by hereditary privilege, by recommendation, by service in the imperial guard and, above all, by promotion from the clerical sub-bureaucracy, the li, whose members the Song literati had regarded as their social inferiors. Mote described an educated class pushed out of its expected careers and into teaching, medicine, divination, painting and the theatre; the great age of zaju drama and of the scholar-painters belongs to the men the Yuan did not employ 4.
Then the examination came back, in a form that would outlive the dynasty that restored it by more than five centuries. The edict of the eleventh month of 1313, under the emperor Ayurbarwada, set the rules 8:
- Provincial examinations in the eighth month of 1314, metropolitan examinations the following spring.
- The Four Books to be examined "using Master Zhu's chapter-and-verse commentaries" (用朱氏章句集註), that is, Zhu Xi's.
- Separate papers by category: Mongols and Semu answered five questions on the classics and one policy essay; Hanren and Nanren sat three sessions of harder papers.
- A quota of 300 candidates for the metropolitan examination and 100 graduates, divided equally among the four categories, 25 places each.
The first palace examination, in the third month of 1315, passed 56 men 8. The quota meant that the Mongols and Semu, a small minority of the empire's people, had as many places between them as the Hanren and Nanren together, and the southern Chinese, the largest population of all, had exactly as many as the Mongols. The curriculum meant something larger. Benjamin Elman's history of the examinations reads the Yuan restoration as the decisive moment at which Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucianism became, in his reviewer's summary, "an exclusive orthodoxy to support education and examinations for the rest of Chinese examination history" 19. The Ming kept the Yuan curriculum when it restored examinations of its own, and the Qing kept it after the Ming 19. The civil examinations were abolished by Qing edict in 1905 still examining the Four Books in Zhu Xi's reading.
The irony is exact. The Song state had treated Zhu Xi's school at times as heterodox. A Mongol court with an ethnic quota system made it the state orthodoxy of every Chinese government until the twentieth century.
The province and the capital
The branch secretariat began as an expedient. When the Mongol court needed to govern a newly conquered region it sent out a detachment of the Central Secretariat, a xing (mobile) secretariat, with civil and military authority combined. By the early fourteenth century these detachments had settled into permanent regional governments: Lingbei for the Mongolian homeland, Liaoyang, Henan, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan, Jiangzhe, Jiangxi and Huguang, with the metropolitan region around Dadu governed directly by the Central Secretariat and Tibet by the Xuanzheng yuan 20.
This is the origin of the Chinese province. Li Zhi'an, the leading Chinese historian of the system, calls it without qualification "the most important political legacy that Khubilai and the Yuan empire left to later China" (行省制无疑是忽必烈和元帝国留给后世中国的一份最重要的政治遗产), and argues that it "created a new model of central and local power in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, with an influence on the Ming, the Qing and modern times that was deep and heavy" 21. The Ming renamed the units buzhengshi si, provincial administration commissions, but everyone went on calling them sheng, the "secretariat" in xing zhongshu sheng. That is the word for a Chinese province today. Several of the Yuan units survive under their Yuan names: Yunnan, Gansu, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Henan, Jiangxi.
The capital survived too. Dadu became Beiping when the Ming took it in 1368, and Beijing when the Yongle emperor moved his court there in 1421. With two interruptions, under the early Ming and the Republic of 1928–49, the seat of government that a Mongol khan placed at the edge of the steppe, within reach of his summer capital and his cavalry, has been the capital of China ever since.
Registered by trade, for ever
The occupational registers were the least visible transfer and among the most durable. The Ming founder, who drove the Mongols out, kept their household system. The historian Yue Chih-chia, working on Ming military families, states it plainly: "The Ming government adopted the household registration system of the Yuan dynasty, wherein one's household was registered by the kind of corvée labor and public service that one had to take" 22. Li Zhi'an makes the same point about the four great Ming categories of civilian, military, artisan and salt-producing households, which carried their service by inheritance: they "certainly were not inherited from the Song, but came directly from the Yuan" (肯定不是从宋朝传承的,而是直接来自元朝) 21. A Ming soldier's son was a soldier because a Mongol registrar had once written his ancestor's household into the military column.
Paper as the state

The Zhongtong notes of 1260 were pegged by decree: one string to one ounce of the older silk-backed notes, two strings to an ounce of silver 8. In 1287 the government issued a new note, the Zhiyuan baochao, at one to five of the old, a devaluation by another name 8. The notes were printed from bronze plates in huge runs and circulated across the empire; Marco Polo devoted a chapter to them 23, and the Ilkhanate tried to copy them in Tabriz in 1294, with results described in the atlas's Iran record. The Ming kept a state paper currency too, until it lost its value and the economy moved to silver.
What the new order displaced
Set against the Song state of 1200, the Yuan state of 1300 had removed or demoted:
- The examination as the main road into office, closed from 1238 to 1315 and reopened with ethnic quotas 8.
- A written penal code: the Jin Taihe code was prohibited in 1271 and never replaced 8.
- Chinese as the sole language of command, now a gloss beneath the 'Phags-pa script on sealed edicts 8.
- Chinese military command, withdrawn after Li Tan's rising in 1262 8.
- The southern literati's claim to rule, reduced to a quarter of the examination places and a minority of offices 8.
What it had added — the province, the northern capital, the hereditary household, the Zhu Xi curriculum, the Tibetan bureau — would outlast it. The dynasty is remembered as the one that was absorbed. It is more accurate to say that the next three Chinese states were built inside it.
What the cost was
The transmission's mechanism was conquest. The Chinese administrators who built the Yuan state entered Mongol service because Mongol armies had destroyed the states that previously employed them, and the institutions this record follows were designed to govern people who had been beaten. There is no separating the bill from the transfer. It falls in three instalments: the conquest of the north, the conquest of the south, and ninety years of rule by rank.
The north, 1211–1234: what the registers lost
The Jin dynastic history records what happened when the Mongols besieged the Jin's last capital at Kaifeng. In the fifth month of 1232: 「汴京大疫,凡五十日,諸門出死者九十餘萬人,貧不能葬者不在是數」 — "a great epidemic in Kaifeng; in fifty days, more than 900,000 dead were carried out through the gates, not counting the poor who could not be buried" 1. The physician Li Gao, who was in the city, wrote that at each of its twelve gates the dead "sent out each day were two thousand at most and no less than one thousand at fewest, and this was so for almost three months" 24. Robert Hymes, reading the thirteenth-century medical texts for evidence of plague, has placed the toll at around a million, perhaps four in ten of the city's people 2524.
The demographic record of the whole north is starker and harder to read:
| Year | Count | Households | Persons | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1207 | Jin registration | 7,684,438 | 45,816,079 | Jinshi 1 |
| 1235 | Mongol registration, 36 circuits of the north | 873,781 | 4,754,975 | Yuanshi 8 |
| 1252 | Möngke's re-registration | "over 200,000 more" | — | Yuanshi 8 |
| 1290 | Yuan registration, whole empire, south included | 13,196,206 | 58,834,711 | Yuanshi 8 |
| 1393 | Ming registration | 10,652,870 | 60,545,812 | Mingshi 26 |
The fall from 45.8 million to 4.75 million registered people in the north between 1207 and 1235 is a fall of nine-tenths. It is not a death toll. Registration depends on a functioning administration, and in 1235 there was barely one: households fled south, hid, were enslaved, were held by Mongol princes and commanders as private dependants outside the count. Modern historians therefore treat the registers as a floor of loss, not a measure. Jinping Wang's study of north China concludes that the conquest of 1211–34 "inflicted terrible wartime destruction, wiping out more than one-third of the population and dismantling the existing social order" 27. Macabe Keliher's review of her book gives the contemporary estimates she works with as "some 53.5 million people in 1207, compared to just over 16 million in 1235", and quotes a writer of the 1230s on what happened to the educated class: "Less than one-tenth of [literati] survived. Among those still alive, countless became homeless, fell into slavery, and could not preserve themselves from cold and hunger" 28.
The 1290 figure is also a floor. The Yuan history adds that "the peoples of mountains, marshes and ravine-caves" were not counted (山澤溪洞之民不與焉) 8. Even so, an empire that now included the whole of the former Southern Song registered fewer than sixty million people, against Ho Ping-ti's estimate of more than a hundred million for the Song and Jin together around 1200 2.
The south, 1268–1279: Xiangyang, Changzhou, Yamen
The conquest of the Song was slower and, for most of its length, more controlled. Qubilai wanted the south's tax base intact. The Song's twin fortress cities of Xiangyang and Fancheng on the Han River held out for five years, from 1268 to 1273, and fell only after two Muslim engineers summoned from the Ilkhanate, Ismāʿīl and ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn, built counterweight trebuchets whose stones, the Yuan history records, weighed 150 jin: "when released its sound shook heaven and earth; whatever it struck was smashed; it sank seven chi into the ground". The Song commander Lü Wenhuan "was afraid, and surrendered the city" 8. The atlas's gunpowder record follows the same siege from the other side.
Where a city resisted after the Yangzi crossing, the old steppe rule applied. In the eleventh month of 1275 the Mongol commander Bayan took Changzhou, east of Nanjing: 「宋兵大潰,拔之,屠其城」 — "the Song troops broke; he took it and massacred the city" 8. The defender Yao Xun died with it. Hangzhou, the Song capital, drew the lesson. In the first month of 1276 the boy emperor's court sent a memorial renouncing the imperial title, and the Grand Empress Dowager ordered that the Yuan be treated with "the rites of a subject" 29. The city was spared. The emperor, the dowager and the court were taken north.
The loyalist remnant fought on along the southern coast for three years, around a succession of child emperors. It ended at Yamen, in the estuary west of modern Macau, in the second month of 1279. The minister Lu Xiufu, seeing the fleet lost, took the last emperor, the seven-year-old Zhao Bing, on his back and leapt into the sea. "Many of the palace women and officials followed them in death; after seven days, more than a hundred thousand floating corpses came up out of the sea" (七日,浮屍出於海十餘萬人) 29. The dowager Yang, who had kept the line alive for the boy's sake, drowned herself saying: "It was only for this one piece of Zhao flesh. Now there is no hope" 29. The figure of a hundred thousand is the dynastic history's, not a modern estimate, and it is not recoverable. That the Song state ended in mass death at sea is not in doubt.
Wen Tianxiang will not serve two houses
The most famous single victim of the conquest chose to be one. Wen Tianxiang, a Song chief minister who had raised armies after Hangzhou's surrender, was captured by the troops of the Chinese general Zhang Hongfan, a commander in Mongol service, while eating a meal at Wupoling in 1278. Taken to Dadu, he was offered office repeatedly and refused for more than three years: 「天祥受宋恩,為宰相,安事二姓?願賜之一死足矣」 — "I received the favour of the Song and was its chief minister. How could I serve a second house? Grant me death, and that is enough" 29. He was executed in Dadu in January 1283 at the age of forty-seven, after bowing towards the south. In his sash was found a note that began with Confucius and Mencius and ended: "From now on, I may be nearly without shame" 29.
In prison he wrote the Song of the Righteous Spirit, which opens 「天地有正氣,雜然賦流形」, "Heaven and earth have a righteous spirit, mixed and bestowed through all the forms of things" 30. Chinese schoolchildren still learn it. Its author was killed in the capital that Liu Bingzhong built, by the government that Xu Heng designed, for refusing to join a regime staffed by men who had made the opposite choice.
Rule by rank
The ranking of peoples was not only a matter of appointments. The Yuan penal treatise wrote it into the law of violence 8:
- Killing: "a Mongol who, in a quarrel or while drunk, beats a Han to death" was to be sentenced to military service and made to pay the full burial money. He was not to be executed.
- Self-defence: "when a Mongol quarrels with a Han and strikes the Han, the Han shall not strike back, but is permitted to complain to the authorities".
- Arms: "Han who carry weapons are prohibited", soldiers excepted.
The fiscal administration was the other face of the ranking. Qubilai's finance ministers were chosen for their ability to raise revenue, and the most effective of them, the Central Asian Muslim Ahmad Fanākatī, ran the empire's finances for almost twenty years through monopolies, re-registration and the placing of his own men. In the third month of 1282, while the emperor was at his summer capital, a Chinese officer named Wang Zhu gathered more than eighty men, announced the false return of the crown prince, and smashed Ahmad's skull with a bronze hammer hidden in his sleeve. Wang Zhu was executed. When Qubilai learned the extent of Ahmad's crimes he said, "Wang Zhu was right to kill him", and had Ahmad's tomb opened and his corpse cut to pieces outside the Tongxuan gate and the flesh thrown to the dogs 8.
In the south, the Supervisor of Buddhism, the Tangut monk Yang Lianzhenjia, operated under the protection of the minister Sangha. The Yuan history lists what he did 8:
- He dug up the tombs of the Song imperial house at Qiantang and Shaoxing, together with the graves of their ministers, "one hundred and one in all" (凡一百一所).
- He killed four commoners.
- He took 1,700 ounces of gold, 6,800 ounces of silver, 116,200 ingots' worth of paper money and 23,000 mu of land.
- He shielded 23,000 households from taxation as Buddhist dependants.
The bones of the Song emperors were the price of a Tibetan Buddhist establishment run from a Chinese-style ministry.
The conquest also became a source of soldiers. The invasions of Japan in 1274, with 900 ships and 15,000 troops, and in 1281, with a fleet the Yuan history numbers at 100,000 men under Fan Wenhu, drew heavily on Korean and southern Chinese forces. The history's claim that of the 100,000 "only three returned" is rhetoric; the losses were nonetheless catastrophic 8.
1344–1351: the river, the dyke and the Red Turbans
The dynasty ended where its legitimacy was supposed to lie: in the management of the land. In the fifth month of 1344, after more than twenty days of rain, the Yellow River broke the Baimao dyke, and in the sixth month the Jin dyke, flooding the plain of Shandong and Henan 8. The court debated for years. In 1351 the minister Jia Lu was given charge of closing the breach and returning the river to its old course. He conscripted 150,000 civilian labourers from thirteen circuits and 20,000 soldiers, 170,000 people in all; the work began in the fourth month and the earthworks were finished in the eleventh 8.
The engineering succeeded. The levy did not. In the same year, among the labour gangs and the flooded districts, the millenarian Red Turban movement rose in revolt. John Dardess's study of late-Yuan politics follows the court's descent from there into factional collapse 31. Within seventeen years one of the rebel captains, Zhu Yuanzhang, had taken the south, proclaimed the Ming, and sent his armies north. In 1368 the last Yuan emperor, Toghon Temür, abandoned Dadu and rode back onto the steppe.
What the sources cannot count
The bill of this record rests on sources written by the winners of each round:
- The Jinshi, Songshi and Yuanshi were all compiled under later dynasties: the first two by a Yuan commission in the 1340s, the last by the Ming in 1369–70, in a few months, by men with every reason to blacken the dynasty they had replaced.
- The registers count tax-paying households, not people, and the Mongols' own dependants were outside them.
- The figures of 900,000 at Kaifeng and 100,000 at Yamen are traditional, round, and unverifiable; modern estimates of the north's loss range from "more than one-third" to far higher 2728.
- The revisionists, Sugiyama Masaaki above all, have argued that "the image of destruction and slaughter" (破壊や殺戮のイメージ) has crowded out what the Mongol empire connected and built 32. The argument is strong for Hangzhou, which surrendered and was spared, and weak for Changzhou.
The bill
The record's cost, stated plainly:
- The north: the Jin state destroyed between 1211 and 1234; at Kaifeng in 1232, by the Jin history's count, more than 900,000 dead in fifty days; the registered population of the north reduced from 45.8 million in 1207 to 4.75 million in 1235, a loss that modern estimates put at no less than a third 1827.
- The south: Xiangyang besieged five years; Changzhou massacred in 1275; the Song ended at Yamen in 1279 with the drowning of a seven-year-old emperor and, by the Song history's count, a hundred thousand bodies in the sea 829.
- The refusers: Wen Tianxiang, executed at Dadu in January 1283 for declining to serve 29.
- The ranked law: a legal order in which a Mongol who beat a Han to death was not executed, and the Han he struck could not strike back 8.
- The predations of office: Ahmad's fiscal regime, ended by a hammer in 1282; one hundred and one Song tombs opened by Yang Lianzhenjia 88.
- The levies: the Japan fleets of 1274 and 1281; 170,000 conscripted for the dyke in 1351, and the war that began among them 88.
The province, the capital, the household register and the examination curriculum outlasted all of it. They are the reason the Yuan matters, and they were made by a state whose first act in China was an argument about whether to empty it.
What followed
-
12071207: the Jurchen Jin register 7,684,438 households and 45,816,079 people in north China, the last full count before the Mongol invasions begin in 1211.
-
12321232: during the Mongol siege of Kaifeng an epidemic kills, by the Jin history's count, more than 900,000 people in fifty days; the Jin dynasty ends at Caizhou in 1234.
-
12351235: the Mongol registration of thirty-six circuits of north China finds 873,781 households and 4,754,975 people — a register, not a census, but a measure of how little of the Jin state survived.
-
12381238: at Yelü Chuzai's request, examinations are held across the north to select scholars by Confucian learning; the experiment is then halted for seventy-seven years.
-
12601260: Qubilai accepts the throne at Kaiping, establishes the Central Secretariat, proclaims the reign title Zhongtong and issues the Zhongtong paper notes, pegged to silver.
-
12621262: Li Tan rises in Shandong; his father-in-law Wang Wentong, chief minister of the Central Secretariat, is executed, and Chinese commanders lose independent authority.
-
12691269: the 'Phags-pa script is promulgated for all sealed imperial documents, with Chinese and other scripts relegated to glosses.
-
127118 December 1271: the edict 建國號詔 names the state Da Yuan from the Book of Changes; the same day the Jin Taihe law code is prohibited and never replaced.
-
12731273: Xiangyang surrenders after a five-year siege, broken by counterweight trebuchets built by the Muslim engineers Ismāʿīl and ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn.
-
12751275: Bayan takes Changzhou and massacres the city; Hangzhou surrenders without a fight two months later.
-
12791279: at Yamen, Lu Xiufu leaps into the sea with the seven-year-old Song emperor Zhao Bing; the Song history records more than 100,000 bodies surfacing over seven days.
-
12821282: the finance minister Ahmad Fanākatī is killed with a bronze hammer by the officer Wang Zhu; Qubilai later has Ahmad's corpse thrown to the dogs.
-
1283January 1283: Wen Tianxiang, captured Song chief minister, is executed at Dadu after refusing to serve the Yuan for more than three years.
-
12901290: the Yuan registers 13,196,206 households and 58,834,711 people across the whole empire, excluding the hill and cave peoples of the south.
-
13131313: the examination edict restores the jinshi with Zhu Xi's commentaries on the Four Books as the set texts and equal quotas for Mongols, Semu, Hanren and Nanren.
-
13511351: Jia Lu conscripts 170,000 labourers and soldiers to close the Yellow River breach of 1344; the Red Turban rebellion breaks out the same year.
-
13681368: Toghon Temür abandons Dadu for the steppe; the Ming keep the branch secretariats as provinces, the hereditary household registers and the Zhu Xi curriculum.
-
14211421: the Yongle emperor moves the Ming court to Beijing, the former Dadu, which remains the capital of China for most of the centuries since.
-
19051905: the Qing abolish the civil-service examinations, which had examined the Four Books in Zhu Xi's reading since the Yuan restoration of 1313.
Where this lives today
References
- Toqto'a 脫脫 et al. 金史 Jinshi [History of the Jin]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975; rev. ed. 2020. Juan 17 (Aizong: the Kaifeng epidemic of 1232) and 46 (food and money: the registration of 1207). zh primary
- Ho, Ping-ti. "An Estimate of the Total Population of Sung-Chin China." In Études Song in memoriam Étienne Balazs, ed. Françoise Aubin, sér. 1, fasc. 1, 33–53. Paris: Mouton, 1970. en
- Smith, Paul Jakov, and Richard von Glahn, eds. The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in Chinese History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003. en
- Mote, Frederick W. "Chinese society under Mongol rule, 1215–1368." In The Cambridge History of China, Volume 6, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, 616–664. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. en
- Franke, Herbert, and Denis Twitchett, eds. The Cambridge History of China, Volume 6: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. en
- Chan, Hok-lam. Legitimation in Imperial China: Discussions under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty (1115–1234). Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984. en
- Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing. The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty. Harvard East Asian Monographs 77. Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1978. en
- Song Lian 宋濂 et al. 元史 Yuanshi [History of the Yuan]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976 (15 vols). Juan cited: 4–7 (Shizu annals, incl. the 建國號詔 of 1271), 58 (geography: registrations of 1235, 1252, 1290), 66 (Yellow River), 81 (examinations), 85 and 87 (officialdom), 93 (paper money), 105 (penal law), 127 (Bayan), 146 (Yelü Chuzai), 157 (Liu Bingzhong), 158 (Xu Heng), 202 (Buddhists: 'Phags-pa, Yang Lianzhenjia), 203 (artisans: Ismāʿīl), 205 (Ahmad), 208 (Japan). zh primary
- Allsen, Thomas T. "The rise of the Mongolian empire and Mongolian rule in north China." In The Cambridge History of China, Volume 6, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, 321–413. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. en
- Rossabi, Morris. Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. en
- Endicott-West, Elizabeth. "The Yüan government and society." In The Cambridge History of China, Volume 6, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, 587–615. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. en
- Franke, Herbert. From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God: The Legitimation of the Yüan Dynasty. Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, 1978, Heft 2. München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1978. en
- Rossabi, Morris. "The reign of Khubilai khan." In The Cambridge History of China, Volume 6, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, 414–489. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. en
- Endicott-West, Elizabeth. Mongolian Rule in China: Local Administration in the Yuan Dynasty. Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph Series 29. Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1989. en
- Barrett, T. H. "The First Emperor." Review of Morris Rossabi, Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times. London Review of Books 10, no. 20 (10 November 1988). en
- 舩田善之 Funada Yoshiyuki. 「元朝治下の色目人について」 [On the Semu under Yuan rule]. 『史学雑誌』 Shigaku zasshi 108, no. 9 (1999): 1593–1618. ja
- 杉山正明 Sugiyama Masaaki. 『モンゴル帝国と大元ウルス』. 東洋史研究叢刊 65. 京都: 京都大学学術出版会, 2004. ja
- 杉山正明 Sugiyama Masaaki. 『クビライの挑戦——モンゴルによる世界史の大転回』. 東京: 朝日新聞社, 1995; 講談社学術文庫, 2010. ja
- Elman, Benjamin A. A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Summary quoted from Oliver Moore's review, Times Higher Education, 5 April 2002. en
- 李治安 Li Zhi'an. 《元代行省制度》 [The branch-secretariat system of the Yuan]. 北京: 中华书局, 2011. zh
- 李治安 Li Zhi'an. 〈蒙元帝国与13–14世纪的中国社会秩序〉 [The Mongol-Yuan empire and Chinese social order in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries]. 《文史哲》 Wen shi zhe 2013, no. 6: 43–50. zh
- Yue Chih-chia 于志嘉. "Household Registration and Service Obligations of Military-Household Families during the Ming: A Case Study of the Shuicheng Lius." Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica 89, no. 3 (2018): 541–604. en
- Polo, Marco. The Book of Ser Marco Polo the Venetian, trans. and ed. Henry Yule, 3rd ed. rev. Henri Cordier. London: John Murray, 1903. Vol. 1, Book II, ch. XXIV: "How the Great Kaan causeth the bark of trees, made into something like paper, to pass for money all over his country." en primary
- Carter, James. "A Mongol siege, the Black Death, and the end of two dynasties." The China Project, 6 April 2022 (with a translation of Li Gao's account of Kaifeng in 1232). en
- Hymes, Robert. "Buboes in Thirteenth-Century China: Evidence from Chinese Medical Writings." In New Evidence for the Dating and Impact of the Black Death in Asia, ed. Monica H. Green. The Medieval Globe. Leeds: ARC Humanities Press, 2022. en
- Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 et al. 明史 Mingshi [History of the Ming], juan 77 (food and money: the registration of 1393). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974. zh primary
- Wang, Jinping. In the Wake of the Mongols: The Making of a New Social Order in North China, 1200–1600. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2018. en
- Keliher, Macabe. Review of Jinping Wang, In the Wake of the Mongols. Journal of Social History 53, no. 4 (2020): 1110–1112. en
- Toqto'a 脫脫 et al. 宋史 Songshi [History of the Song]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977 (40 vols). Juan 47 (the last emperors: Hangzhou 1276, Yamen 1279) and 418 (biography of Wen Tianxiang). zh primary
- Wen Tianxiang 文天祥. 〈正氣歌〉 [Song of the Righteous Spirit]. In 文天祥全集 Wen Tianxiang quanji, ed. Xiong Fei 熊飛, Qi Shenqi 漆身起 and Huang Shunqiang 黃順強. Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1987. zh primary
- Dardess, John W. Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yüan China. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. en
- 杉山正明 Sugiyama Masaaki. 『大モンゴルの世界——陸と海の巨大帝国』. 東京: 角川書店, 1992; 角川ソフィア文庫, 2014. ja