Potosí's silver became the world's money, and the Andes paid (1545)
How a mountain in the southern Andes, a forced-labour draft, mercury from Huancavelica and the Manila galleons made silver the common money of Habsburg Spain, its Genoese bankers and Ming China
In April 1545 the first silver claims were registered on the Cerro Rico of Potosí. Within fifty years it was refining more than 200 tonnes of silver a year, drafting some 13,500 Andean men annually to dig it, and paying for Philip II's wars. Through Manila, founded in 1571, the same silver crossed the Pacific to a Ming China that had just begun collecting its taxes in silver. The world's first global money was mined under compulsion and poisoned by mercury.
Before: an empire without money, a mountain without miners (c. 1430–1545)
In the ninth year of the Wanli reign, 1581, the Ming court ordered that a reform it had tried and abandoned several times under the Jiajing emperor be applied in every province. The official history of the dynasty, the Ming shi, defines it in one sentence: all of a county's land tax and labour service were to be "merged into a single item", assessed by acreage and "collected in silver" (皆計畝徵銀) 1. That was the single-whip method, yitiao bianfa. It made the world's most populous state pay its taxes in a metal it barely mined. The silver it needed came, in large part, from a mountain on the other side of the Pacific, 4,000 metres up in the southern Andes, that no one had worked for silver before April 1545.
The two worlds this record joins had, before that date, almost nothing to do with each other. Each had what the other lacked. China had a commercial economy of enormous size and no reliable money. The Andes had silver, and a political economy that ran without money at all. Between them stood the Habsburg crowns of Castile and the Empire, which had wars to fight and bankers to pay. Within a century, silver bound all three together.
Ming China: an economy in search of a currency
The Ming founder, the Hongwu emperor, had tried to run his state on paper and on goods. His paper notes, the baochao, first issued in 1375, were printed without restraint and lost nearly all their value within a few generations, and the dynasty's taxes were collected largely in grain, cloth and compulsory labour service 2. The economy outgrew those arrangements. Richard von Glahn and the Chinese historian Wan Ming both describe the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries as a period in which silver, weighed out in uncoined ingots, became the money of private commerce from below, before the state accepted it 23. The first large step by the state came early: the Ming shi records that more than four million shi of tax grain owed by the southern provinces were commuted into over a million taels of "gold-flower silver" (金花銀) a year, paid into the palace treasury 1.
What China did not have was enough silver of its own. Its mines were small. A great commercial economy, the cotton and silk districts of the Yangzi delta, the porcelain kilns of Jingdezhen, the merchant houses of Huizhou and Fujian, was running on a money that its own territory could not supply. The maritime prohibition, haijin, forbade private overseas trade, and the trade went on anyway, through smugglers and the "pirate" networks of the southeast coast. In the late sixteenth century, when silver did arrive in quantity, its price in China, measured against gold, was roughly double its price in Europe 4. For anyone who could carry silver to China, that difference was the most profitable fact on earth.
The Andes: metal as colour, labour as tribute
The Andean world that held the silver ran on a different logic altogether. Tawantinsuyu, the empire of the Incas that the Spanish had conquered after 1532, had no markets in the European sense and no money. Its state was financed by labour. Under the mit'a, as John Murra reconstructed it, "a proportion of the domestic units in a community had to provide their labour for a fixed period", on roads, bridges, herds, fields, mines and war, and the state returned food, drink and cloth to those who served 5. Gold and silver mattered, but as colour and sacred substance, worked into sheet and offered to the gods and the Inca; Heather Lechtman's study of Andean metallurgy shows how far that value system was from treating metal as a measure of price 6.
Andean miners knew how to win silver. Six leagues from Potosí, the mine of Porco had been worked under the Incas, and indigenous lords revealed it to the Spanish in 1538 57. The ores of the region were smelted in small clay furnaces set on windy hillsides, the huayras or guayras. The Jesuit José de Acosta, who travelled the region in the 1570s and 1580s, explained that the Potosí ore "does not melt with bellows" and yields only to "the air of the guayras, which are those little furnaces on the slopes of the hill, in the natural wind" 7. Andean metallurgy, not European, would produce Potosí's first two decades of silver.
The Cerro Rico itself, a red cone rising above 4,700 metres on a cold plateau, had apparently not been worked. Acosta repeats a story that the Incas had heard a voice declare the hill "kept for others" 7. Tristan Platt and Pablo Quisbert have argued instead that the site was known and inhabited, and that the Inca and the local Qaraqara and Charka lords kept a deliberate political silence about it 8. Either way, the place that became one of the largest cities in the Americas was, in 1544, a mountain without miners. The Spanish administrator Luis Capoche, writing in 1585, described its setting as "cold, snow-covered, sterile, fruitless and almost uninhabitable high lands" 9.
The Habsburg crowns: wars before treasure
The third party was already deep in debt. Charles V, king of Castile and Aragon from 1516 and Holy Roman Emperor from 1519, governed the largest collection of territories in Europe and fought for them almost continuously, against France in Italy, the Ottomans in the Mediterranean and Hungary, and the Protestant princes of Germany. He paid through short-term loan contracts called asientos, made with the great merchant-banking houses of Augsburg and Genoa, the Fugger and the Welser above all, secured on the crown's future revenues 1011. The silver of the Americas had begun to arrive at Seville before Potosí, from the Caribbean and from Mexico: Earl Hamilton's series shows an average of under 19 tonnes of fine silver a year registered at Seville in 1546–50, a figure that would rise more than fourteenfold within half a century 12.
What the world of 1545 lacked can be listed with some precision, because each item appeared in the decades that followed:
- A world money. No single commodity yet served as means of payment from western Europe to eastern Asia.
- A Pacific route. No ship crossed the Pacific in regular commerce; Manila did not exist.
- A silver-taxing China. The Ming state still collected most taxes in kind and in labour.
- A labour system for deep mining in the Andes. The Inca mit'a had served the state; it had never been turned into a permanent draft for private mines.
- An Andean mercury industry. The amalgamation process that made low-grade ore profitable was in use in New Spain from the 1550s, but not yet in Peru.
The transmission: a mountain, a draft and two oceans (1545–1600)
April 1545: Gualpa's hill
Acosta names the discoverer as "an Indian called Gualpa, of the Chumbivilca nation", from the region of Cuzco, who was working for Spaniards at Porco and found rich ore on the hill 7. Gualpa smelted it at Porco "by guayra". The first claims were registered on 21 April 1545, by a Spaniard named Villarroel together with an Andean miner, and the great Mendieta vein on 31 August 7. Raquel Gil Montero notes that at least two versions of the discovery circulate; the outline, an Andean find made under Spanish employment and registered by a Spaniard, is common to both 5.
The rush was immediate. By September 1545 some 170 Spaniards and 3,000 Andeans were living at the foot of the hill; within two years there were about 2,500 houses and 14,000 inhabitants 5. For its first quarter-century Potosí was an Andean technology working under Spanish ownership. "Until about 1570 Indians were the main silver producers in Potosí," writes Peter Bakewell: Spaniards held the claims and rented them to native miners, who dug the rich surface ores and smelted them in their own huayras 13. Acosta was told that the slopes had once carried "more than six thousand guayras" 7. In the time of the licenciado Polo, he wrote, between 150,000 and 200,000 pesos were presented every Saturday for the royal fifth, and Acosta reckoned that a third, perhaps a half, of what was mined never reached the tax office at all 7.
The first voice to describe what the hill was doing to people came in 1550. The Dominican friar Domingo de Santo Tomás, defender of Andean communities and author of the first Quechua grammar, wrote to the Council of the Indies 14:
"Four years ago, to finish the ruin of this land, a mouth of hell was discovered, into which every year a great quantity of people enter, whom the greed of the Spaniards sacrifices to their god; and it is a silver mine called Potosí."

Toledo's machine: mercury, mills and the mita (1569–1581)
By the 1560s the surface ores were exhausted. "Mines were growing deeper and the quality of ore lower; production consequently fell," Bakewell writes, and the huayras could not profit from poorer ore 13. The crown's answer was Francisco de Toledo, viceroy of Peru from 1569 to 1581, who rebuilt the Andean economy around the mountain 5. He brought three things together.
The first was mercury amalgamation. Ore crushed to powder was mixed with mercury, salt and other reagents in large patios or vats; the mercury bound the silver, and the amalgam was then heated to drive off the mercury and leave the metal. Pedro Fernández de Velasco, who had seen the method in New Spain, introduced it at Potosí in 1571, and Acosta describes how it turned the old discarded tailings into "infinite silver" 7. The mercury came from Huancavelica in the central Peruvian highlands, where the Andeans had long mined cinnabar for the red pigment they called llimpi, "without knowing of the quicksilver" 7. Acosta dates the discovery of the mercury there to 1566–67; most modern accounts give 1563–64. By the 1580s the mine produced, by his count, "eight thousand quintals of mercury, and even more" a year 7.
The second was water power. Amalgamation needed ore ground fine, and Toledo's regime financed a system of stamp mills, ingenios, driven by water from a chain of artificial reservoirs, the lagunas, built in the hills above the town 5.
The third was labour. From 1573, on the basis of the population counts of his general inspection, Toledo organised the mita de Potosí 15:
- Who: adult men aged 18 to 50, drawn from sixteen highland provinces stretching from around Potosí almost to Cuzco 513.
- How many: about 13,500 a year, organised as three shifts of 4,500; in 1578 the authorities called for more than 14,000 men with their families 165.
- How long: a year of service at Potosí, each shift working one week and resting two, the rest weeks often spent working for wages 17.
- At what price: a mitayo cost a mine-owner about a third of a hired worker, the minga, whose wages ran three or four times higher 1713.
- In exchange for what: mine-owners received their allocations of mitayos in return for building mills and reservoirs 5.
The draft borrowed the Inca word and the Inca habit of rotating labour, and changed their meaning. The Inca mit'a served a state that fed its workers; Toledo's served private mine-owners whom the state subsidised with forced labour.
The mint and the piece of eight
Silver left Potosí as bars or as coin. The foundations of a royal mint, the Casa de Moneda, were laid on 8 December 1572; a sample of its first coins was sent to the king in December 1573, and regular striking began in 1574 18. Its hammer-struck, roughly cut coins, the macuquinas or "cobs", carried the value of eight reales, the real de a ocho, the piece of eight. "It provided most of South America's coin," Bakewell notes 13.
Production soared. "Potosí's output quintupled between the mid-1570s and 1592, the year of all-time highest production (according, at least, to tax records). In that year, some 7.1 million ounces of silver were refined" 13, more than 200 tonnes. Taxed production to 1650 totalled some 450 million ounces, and "true output was undoubtedly higher"; Potosí gave about half of Spanish America's silver before 1650 13. Toledo's own audit counted 76 million pesos taxed up to 1574, and a further 35 million in the next eleven years 7.
| Date | Event at Potosí | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 21 April 1545 | First claims registered on the Cerro Rico | Acosta 7 |
| 1550 | Santo Tomás calls the mine "a mouth of hell" | Santo Tomás 14 |
| 1569–1581 | Viceroyalty of Francisco de Toledo | Gil Montero 5 |
| 1571 | Amalgamation introduced by Pedro Fernández de Velasco | Acosta 7 |
| 1573 | Toledo's mita begins | Cole 15 |
| 1574 | Regular coining at the new mint | Oropeza Alba 18 |
| 1592 | Peak registered output, some 7.1 million ounces | Bakewell 13 |
| 1649 | Great mint fraud broken up by a royal inspector | Lane 19 |
Westward: the fleets, the fifth and the Genoese
From Potosí the silver went by llama and mule train to the Pacific port of Arica, by sea to Callao and Panama, across the isthmus, and by the convoyed fleets to Seville, where the Casa de Contratación registered it. The crown took its fifth, the quinto, and a share of everything else; private remittances to merchants and families made up most of the rest 12. Hamilton's figures for average annual registered imports of fine silver rise from 18.7 tonnes in 1546–50 to a peak of 273.7 tonnes in 1591–95 12.
Almost none of it stayed. The crown's silver was pledged before it landed. Mauricio Drelichman and Hans-Joachim Voth's reconstruction of 438 loan contracts made with Philip II shows a system in which bankers advanced cash for the wars in the Netherlands, the Mediterranean and against England, and were repaid out of future silver and Castilian taxes. Silver was a volatile part of that revenue: "In some years, it accounted for 40% of Crown revenue; in others, almost no silver arrived" 10. The Genoese supplied 80 per cent of the lending before 1575, and the Spinola, Grimaldo and Fugger houses alone 40 per cent of all loans 10.
Eastward: Manila, 1571
The other route ran west across the Pacific. In 1571 Miguel López de Legazpi founded the city of Manila on Luzon, and from then on galleons sailed each year from Acapulco carrying Mexican and Peruvian silver and returned laden with Chinese silks and porcelain. Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, in an article that has shaped the field since 1995, date the birth of the world economy to that founding 4:
"Global trade emerged with the founding of Manila in 1571, at which time all important populated continents began to exchange products continuously."
The Chinese merchants who crossed from Fujian to Manila, whom the Spanish called sangleys, wanted one thing. Antonio de Morga, a judge of the Manila Audiencia, recorded in 1609 that the price of their silks was settled by experts on both sides, and that "what is given for them is silver and reals, for they do not want gold, nor any other goods, nor will they take them to China" 20. The crown limited the trade to two galleons a year carrying at most 500,000 pesos; the limit was evaded constantly 21.
Yuegang, 1567, and the single whip, 1581
The Chinese end of the circuit opened in the same years. In 1567, the first year of the Longqing reign, the governor of Fujian, Tu Zemin, petitioned for the maritime ban to be lifted, and private ships were licensed to trade with the "Eastern and Western Oceans" from the harbour of Yuegang, the Moon Harbour, in the newly created county of Haicheng near Zhangzhou 22. The scholar Zhang Xie, compiling his account of that trade in 1617–18, explained why ships returning from Luzon paid a special surcharge: Luzon "produces nothing else; the foreigners buy goods entirely with silver coin, so the returning ships carry nothing but silver coin" (歸船白銀錢外,無他攜來) 22.
The silver flowed into a fiscal system that was converting itself to it. The single-whip reforms, pressed nationwide by the grand secretary Zhang Juzheng and completed in 1581, merged land tax and labour service and collected them in silver 1. Wan Ming describes the result as a "comprehensive transformation" of the Ming fiscal system, from one based on goods and labour to one based on silver money 3. In Flynn and Giráldez's formulation, China "became the dominant buyer because both its fiscal and monetary systems had converted to a silver standard; the value of silver in China surged to double its worth in the rest of the world" 4.
What changed, and what was replaced
A world priced in silver
By 1600 the same coin passed through the hands of a Fujianese silk merchant in Manila, a Genoese banker in Piacenza, a Portuguese trader in Macao and a mule-driver on the road to Arica. That was new. Flynn and Giráldez's argument is that silver's circulation did not merely link the continents but gave the link its shape: China's demand set silver's value, and the mines of the Americas and of Japan were profitable because of it. "Both Tokugawa Japan and the Spanish empire were financed by mining profits," they write, "profits that would not have existed in the absence of end-customer China" 4.
The engine of the flow was a difference in price. Silver bought more gold in Europe than in China, so carrying silver east and exchanging it there paid handsomely. The figures, assembled by Jacques Melitz from the Chinese monetary historian Peng Xinwei and European series, show how large the gap was and how fast it closed 23:
| Place and date | Gold : silver ratio | Source |
|---|---|---|
| China, about 1610 | about 1 : 8 | Peng Xinwei, via Melitz 23 |
| Japan, about 1610 | about 1 : 11 | Melitz 23 |
| China, 1620s | 1 : 8–10 | Melitz 23 |
| Europe, 1620–40 | near 1 : 14 | Soetbeer, via Melitz 23 |
| China, 1637–40 | about 1 : 13 | Melitz 23 |
| Spain, about 1640 | 1 : 13.13 | Melitz 23 |
By about 1640 the arbitrage had been traded away: the Chinese ratio had risen to the Spanish level 23. Melitz himself doubts that gold-silver arbitrage alone explains the flow, since the gaps also measure the very high costs of moving metal across the world; the trade, as Morga described it, was silk for silver 2320.
How much reached China is still argued over. Liang Fangzhong's 1939 study of Ming foreign trade and silver, and Quan Hansheng's later estimates, laid the Chinese foundations of the subject; Quan cited Pierre Chaunu's estimate that more than a third of American silver ended up in Asia 2425. Von Glahn's revised series finds that Japanese and Spanish American silver reaching China between 1540 and 1640 were "roughly equal", and that "the great surge in silver imports to China after 1620 came from Japanese mines" 21. Manila's customs records put the peak of its silver exports to China in 1595–1616, which accounted for 70 per cent of all Philippine silver exports before 1645 21. Potosí was not the only source of the world's silver; it was, for half a century, the largest.
In Ming China: taxes in silver, labour in silver
In China the silver displaced two older ways of paying the state. Grain and cloth delivered in kind gave way to silver payments; so did the labour service, the rotating corvée through which households had supplied the state with runners, guards, porters and clerks. The Ming shi explains that under the single whip "the labour of a year" was to be arranged by the officials themselves (官為僉募), paid for out of the silver collected 1. That released millions of households from compulsory service and turned their obligation into a cash debt.
It also bound them to a metal whose supply was decided in Potosí, Iwami and the shipping lanes. A farming household now had to sell its crop or its cloth for silver to pay its tax, and the price at which it could do so depended on how much silver was circulating. The official historians noted soberly that within "ten-odd years" of its adoption the single whip's rules had "fallen into disorder" and could not be fully observed 1. Wan Ming's verdict is that the arrival of foreign silver and the Ming state's demand for it were closely timed: "whether the mining of Japanese silver or the development of the American mines, both coincided in time with the enormous demand for silver produced by China's monetisation" 3.
What was replaced in China, in short:
- Paper money, already discredited, was abandoned for uncoined silver weighed by the tael.
- Tax in kind (grain, cloth) gave way to silver assessed on land.
- Labour service gave way to silver payments and hired labour.
- The maritime prohibition gave way, at Yuegang, to a licensed and taxed private trade.

In Castile and Europe: prices and the borrower from hell
Hamilton argued in 1934 that American treasure caused the great rise of European prices in the sixteenth century, the "price revolution". His own Spanish price index rose from about 99 in 1511–15 to 343 in 1646–50, roughly three-and-a-half times 12. The quantity theory he applied has been fought over ever since: critics have pointed to population growth, rising demand and faster circulation of money as causes, and to prices that began rising before the treasure peaked 12. One fact in his own data has worn well. English prices over the same period rose almost sevenfold, twice as fast as Spanish ones 12. Silver did its work by leaving Spain.
It left through the crown's debts. Philip II stopped payments to his bankers four times, in 1557, 1560, 1575 and 1596; the debt affected in 1575 amounted to 12.3 million ducats, 1.9 times a year's revenue, and in 1596 the stop followed a year, 1594, in which "the silver fleets did not sail" 10. The older Spanish historiography, from Ramón Carande's study of Charles V's bankers onward, read these as the ruin of Castile at the hands of foreign financiers 11. Drelichman and Voth argue that they were negotiated reschedulings within a lending system that remained profitable for the lenders, the defaults of a "borrower from hell" whom bankers nevertheless kept lending to 10. Both readings agree on what the silver bought: soldiers in Flanders, galleys in the Mediterranean, the Armada of 1588. Drelichman and Voth quote Geoffrey Parker's observation that during Philip II's reign of forty-two years, Castile was at peace for a total of six months 10.
In the Andes: from reciprocity to the draft and the wage
The deepest replacement happened at the source. Acosta saw it happening: on the slopes where there had once been more than six thousand huayras, by about 1590 "if there are one or two thousand, it will be a great deal", because amalgamation had made Andean smelting obsolete 7. Andean technology, which had produced the first quarter-century of Potosí's silver, was displaced by a European one that required mercury, capital, mills and a captive workforce.
The Andean institutions of labour were reshaped around the mines:
- The mit'a, a rotating service to a state that fed its servers, became the mita, a draft for private mine-owners. Tristan Platt has argued that Andean communities met the draft partly to secure title to their lands, and called it "voluntary unfree labour" 5.
- The ayllu, the kin-based community, was regrouped into reducciones, Spanish-style towns into which Toledo ordered dispersed settlements concentrated, partly so that tribute and the mita could be counted 165.
- Wage labour appeared beside the draft. By 1600 hired mingas were about half the labour force 13. A description of Potosí in 1603 counted about 58,800 Andean workers, of whom only 5,100 were serving mitayos, 10,500 mingas and some 43,200 other free workers, figures that Gil Montero warns are "for discussion purposes only" 5.
- Mobility became a strategy. Those who left their communities became forasteros, outsiders, exempt from the mita in their new villages; by 1683 nearly half the indigenous people counted in Charcas were migrants 265.
- Native lords, the kurakas, became recruiters, responsible for delivering their quota of men or paying for replacements 16.
Manila's Parián
Across the Pacific, Manila grew into a city that existed because of the silver trade, with a Spanish walled town and, beside it, the Parián, the market quarter of the Chinese. Morga describes the cargoes unloaded there, the duties of three per cent paid on them, and the trading season that closed by the end of May so that the galleons could sail for New Spain by the end of June 20. The Chinese outnumbered the Spanish many times over. The Spanish depended on them for food, crafts and trade, and feared them. That combination produced the record's most concentrated act of violence.
What the cost was
The silver that became the world's money was paid for in the bodies of Andean men and the survival of Andean communities, in mercury that poisoned those who handled it, and, at the far end of the Pacific route, in the lives of thousands of Chinese in Manila. The bill can be itemised. Some of it was recorded by the officials who ran the system; some by the clergy who watched it.
The mita's bill
The draft took about 13,500 men a year from sixteen provinces, at the price of a third of a free wage 1617. Many of the men travelled to Potosí with their wives and children 5. Acosta, no enemy of the system, described the ore-carriers climbing out of the mine with loads of two arrobas, some 23 kilograms, strapped to their chests 7:
"They climb three by three. The first carries a candle tied to his thumb so they can see, because, as has been said, there is no light from the sky, and they hold on with both hands; and so they climb so great a distance that, as I have said, it is often more than a hundred and fifty estados: a horrible thing, which only to think of it fills one with fear, so great is the love of money."
A hundred and fifty estados is something like 250 metres of ladder. Underground there were falls, collapses and the dust that caused silicosis; in the refining mills there was mercury. "Thousands upon thousands of miners lost their lives," J. H. Elliott writes, summarising Kris Lane's history of the city, "either as the result of accidents in terrifyingly dangerous working conditions or from exposure to mercury vapor, lead, zinc, and other toxins" 2728.
How many died of the mita itself, as distinct from the epidemics that swept the Andes in the same decades, is a real debate, and the record names it rather than resolving it. Bakewell, the historian of Potosí's labour, argued that "available records suggest that the mita was not responsible, as is still sometimes maintained, for the deaths of enormous numbers of native people. Disease was by far the larger destroyer of Indians in the Central Andes" 1329. Jeffrey Cole, Ward Stavig and Nicholas Robins have stressed instead the coercion, the deaths from mercury and silicosis, and the disintegration of the communities that sent the men 153031. No one disputes that the mita was forced labour that "those subject to it… could avoid only with great difficulty", in Bakewell's own words, and that the work was "hard and dangerous" 13.
Mercury: Huancavelica
The mercury that made Potosí's silver came from a second mine, worked by its own draft. Acosta describes what the metal did to those who heated the amalgam: when the vessels were opened and any smoke or vapour reached the men, "they are quicksilvered and die, or are left badly damaged, or lose their teeth" 7. Kendall Brown's study of workers' health at Huancavelica records why contemporaries called it the "mine of death": the respiratory diseases, the injuries, the altitude and the steady poisoning of a workforce that breathed cinnabar dust and mercury vapour underground 32. The Andean chronicler Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, writing around 1615, singled it out 33:
"In the said mercury mines of Huancavelica is where the poor Indians suffer so much punishment and receive torments, and so many Indians die."
And of what the survivors brought home, he wrote that "in the end they come out very poor and with much debt, and have nothing with which to pay their tribute" 33.
Empty villages
The draft fell on communities whose populations were falling. It was assessed on Toledo's counts of the 1570s and was not reduced as epidemics, flight and the draft itself emptied the villages. Teresa Cañedo-Argüelles's study of the province of Pacajes, south of Lake Titicaca, shows what that meant by the mid-seventeenth century 16:
- Absence: about half of the Andeans registered in each Pacajes village were absent as forasteros.
- A fixed quota on a shrinking base: new counts showed about a thousand fewer men liable to serve than Toledo's, while the mine-owners still demanded the full 13,500.
- Cash for bodies: community captains had to pay seven pesos for each missing man so that a substitute could be hired; mine-owners often pocketed the money, and the men they never saw were called indios de faltriquera, "pocket Indians".
- Desolation: a village priest of Caquiavire testified in 1661 that the town of San Andrés was "very scattered, annihilated and destroyed", its estancias "empty and depopulated, and all caused by the mita of Potosí" 16.
The draft continued, in varying forms, until the early nineteenth century, and its bill did not end with it. Melissa Dell's study of the districts that lay on either side of the mita boundary in southern Peru found that "a mita effect lowers household consumption by around 25% and increases the prevalence of stunted growth in children by around 6 percentage points in subjected districts today" 34.
Manila, October 1603
The Chinese end of the silver road had its own toll. By the early seventeenth century the Chinese of Manila outnumbered the Spanish many times over, and Spanish fear of them, fed by the arrival in 1603 of Ming officials enquiring about a mountain of gold, ended in war. In October 1603 the Chinese rose, or were provoked into rising; Morga, who was there, says that under 700 Spaniards in the city could bear arms 20. The Chinese, "after having lost more than four thousand men", withdrew from the city; the remnant was hunted down at San Pablo and Batangas and destroyed, "none escaped, except two hundred" sent to the galleys 20. José Rizal, annotating Morga in 1890, noted that "it is said that more than 23,000 Chinese were killed", and quoted the chronicler Argensola on why the number was played down: so that "the illegality committed in allowing so many to enter the country contrary to the royal prohibitions might not be known" 20. The dead of the fighting and the pursuit together numbered, on these accounts, well over 20,000.
Morga recorded the sequel without irony: with no Chinese left to work at the trades and bring in provisions, "there was no food, nor any shoes to wear, not even at excessive prices" 20. The trade resumed within a few years, and so did the Chinese community; another uprising and massacre followed in 1639.
The silver that lied, and the dynasty that fell
The system also corroded its own money. By the 1640s the debasement of Potosí's coin had become routine; the scheme implicated the town's corregidor and judges of the Audiencia of Charcas, and was broken up in 1649 by a royal inspector, Francisco de Nestares Marín 19. Francisco Gómez de la Rocha, the silver merchant at the centre of the fraud, was executed. The coins of the world's most trusted silver had been short of their fineness for years 19.
At the other end, a famous argument once held that silver brought down the Ming. William Atwell proposed that the sharp fall in silver imports at the end of the 1630s produced a deflation that deepened the crises in which the dynasty fell in 1644 35. Von Glahn has argued against it that the demand for silver in China "was determined by long-term changes in indigenous demand for money rather than short-term fluctuations in the flow of silver imports" 36. The cost that the record can document in China is the slower one, the binding of tens of millions of farming households to the price of a metal mined on the other side of the world.
| Who paid | What was paid | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Andean men of sixteen provinces | About 13,500 a year drafted to the mines from 1573 | Cañedo-Argüelles 16 |
| Workers at Huancavelica and in the mills | Mercury poisoning, silicosis, accidents | Acosta, Brown 732 |
| Andean communities | Flight, depopulation, a quota fixed on old counts | Cañedo-Argüelles 16 |
| Their descendants | Lower consumption and more child stunting today | Dell 34 |
| The Chinese of Manila | More than 4,000 killed at the city in 1603, and by later accounts over 20,000 in all | Morga, Rizal 20 |
| Ming households | Taxes owed in a metal whose price was set abroad | Ming shi, von Glahn 121 |
What followed
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154521 April 1545: the first claims on the Cerro Rico of Potosí are registered, after the Andean prospector Gualpa finds rich silver ore on the hill; within two years the camp holds some 14,000 people.
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15501550: the Dominican Domingo de Santo Tomás writes to the Council of the Indies that Potosí is "a mouth of hell" into which the greed of the Spaniards sacrifices a great quantity of people every year.
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15671567: at the request of the governor of Fujian, the Ming court lifts the maritime ban for private ships sailing from Yuegang, the Moon Harbour of Haicheng county near Zhangzhou.
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15711571: Miguel López de Legazpi founds Manila; the annual galleons from Acapulco begin carrying American silver across the Pacific to buy Chinese silk and porcelain.
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15711571: Pedro Fernández de Velasco introduces mercury amalgamation at Potosí, turning low-grade ore and old tailings into silver and displacing the Andean wind furnaces, the huayras.
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15731573: Viceroy Francisco de Toledo's mita begins drafting about 13,500 men a year, aged 18 to 50, from sixteen highland provinces stretching from Potosí almost to Cuzco.
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15741574: the new royal mint at Potosí begins regular striking of hammered silver coin, including the eight-real piece, the piece of eight that would circulate from Seville to Canton.
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15751575: Philip II stops payment on 12.3 million ducats of short-term debt, nearly twice a year's revenue, owed mainly to Genoese bankers who had lent against future silver.
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15801580s: the mercury mine of Huancavelica, worked by its own draft, produces some 8,000 quintals a year for Potosí's refineries; its workers call it the mine of death.
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15811581: the Ming court applies the single-whip method in every province, merging land tax and labour service into one payment assessed by acreage and collected in silver.
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15921592: registered output at Potosí reaches its all-time peak, some 7.1 million ounces of silver, more than 200 tonnes, five times the level of the mid-1570s.
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15951591–95: registered imports of fine silver at Seville average 273.7 tonnes a year, more than fourteen times the level of 1546–50.
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1603October 1603: after an uprising of Manila's Chinese, Spanish forces and their allies kill more than 4,000 in the fighting at the city and hunt down the rest; later accounts put the dead above 20,000.
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16491649: a royal inspector breaks up the great Potosí mint fraud, a routine debasement of the coin implicating the corregidor and judges of the Audiencia of Charcas.
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16611661: the priest of Caquiavire in Pacajes testifies that the town of San Andrés is "annihilated and destroyed", its estancias empty, "all caused by the mita of Potosí".
Where this lives today
References
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