Nursing-home deaths up 10%, practice prices up 11%, vet bills up 63%: what private equity's roll-up of vets, dentists, care homes and trades does to a town.
The Quiet Purchase of the High Street
How private equity reached the local vet, dentist and care home
Between 2010 and 2019, private equity investment in US health care rose from $41.5 billion to $119.9 billion a year ✓ Established [1], and the money did not go to a few large hospitals. It went to the small, owner-run practices that make up a town: the vet, the dentist, the dermatologist, the nursing home, the hospice and, increasingly, the plumber. The best evidence now available shows a consistent pattern — higher prices, thinner staffing and, in care settings, measurable harm to patients.
The core question of this report has a short answer. When private equity buys a fragmented local service and consolidates it, prices usually rise and staffing usually falls; where the service is medical care for frail people, the outcomes get worse ◈ Strong Evidence. In nursing homes, a study of more than 18,000 facilities found that private equity ownership raised short-term mortality among Medicare residents by about 10% — more than 20,000 additional deaths over 2004 to 2019 [2] [3]. In hospitals, adverse events such as falls and central-line infections rose by 25% after acquisition [4]. In physician practices, prices paid per claim rose 11% [5]. In UK veterinary care, average prices rose 63% between 2016 and 2023, and large groups charged 16.6% more than independent practices [6]. None of these numbers is the result of a single scandal. They are the measured average outcome of a business model applied to tens of thousands of local firms.
That model is the roll-up, also called buy-and-build. A fund buys a platform company in a fragmented sector, then adds dozens or hundreds of smaller firms to it, often keeping each firm's original name on the door. The Private Equity Stakeholder Project counted 1,049 private equity health care deals in the United States in 2024, of which 621 were add-ons to existing platforms — 59% of the total ✓ Established [7]. Dental practices led every segment with 161 deals, ahead of behavioural health with 65 and home health, home care and hospice with 62 [7]. The add-on is the defining unit of the strategy. Each one is small, few attract attention, and almost none of them is large enough to require notification to federal antitrust agencies [8].
The spread has been fast. Private equity-owned physician practice sites in the United States grew from 816 in 119 metropolitan areas in 2012 to 5,779 in 307 areas in 2021 [9]. By 2021 a single private equity firm held more than 30% of a specialty market in 108 metropolitan areas and more than 50% in 50 of them [9]. In veterinary medicine, corporations owned about 10% of US practices a decade ago and own an estimated 30 to 50% today, rising to roughly 75% in specialty and emergency care ◈ Strong Evidence [10]. In the UK, more than 60% of veterinary practices now belong to six groups — CVS, IVC, Linnaeus, Medivet, Pets at Home and VetPartners — three of which are owned by private equity funds [11]. The same structure appears in Canada, where six companies own about 20% of practices [12], and in Australia, where the competition regulator reports that medical, dental, veterinary and aged-care roll-ups feature heavily in the first year of mandatory merger notification [13].
The sectors share four features that make them attractive to the model. They are fragmented, so no single acquisition looks like a monopoly. They are owner-operated, so a generation of retiring founders creates a steady supply of sellers. They are paid for by insurers, governments or captive customers whose demand does not fall when prices rise — a sick dog, a broken boiler and an ageing parent are not discretionary purchases. And they are local, so a firm that owns most of the practices within a 30-minute drive can set prices for the town even if its national market share is trivial. The following sectors now carry measurable private equity penetration:
- Physician specialties. 4.9% of US physicians were affiliated with private equity in 2019, rising to 7.5% in dermatology and 7.4% in gastroenterology, and to 18.2% in Washington, DC [14].
- Dentistry. Private equity invested about $4.4 billion in dental practices between 2004 and 2021, and the share of dentists who own their practice fell from 85% in 2005 to 73% in 2023 [15].
- Veterinary care. Private equity spent an estimated $45 billion on veterinary deals between 2017 and 2022 [16].
- Autism therapy. 574 private equity-owned autism therapy centres operated in 42 US states in 2024, nearly 80% acquired between 2018 and 2022 [17].
- Home trades. PitchBook recorded 55 private equity HVAC deals in 2024, up 72% and the highest since at least 2017 [18].
- Death care and accounting. About 1,000 of 19,000 US funeral homes were private equity-backed by 2022 [19], and 11 of the 30 largest US accounting firms had private equity backing by late 2025 [20].
This report does not argue that private equity is uniquely malign, nor that every acquisition harms customers. Some studies, discussed in section 8, find neutral or positive effects, and the absolute share of some sectors remains small: private equity owns only 3.5% of US short-term acute hospitals ✓ Established [21]. The argument is narrower and better supported. A specific financial technique — consolidating local services with borrowed money and selling them within a few years — produces predictable pressure on prices, staffing and quality. A 2023 systematic review in the BMJ, covering 55 studies across eight countries, found that private equity ownership was often associated with harmful impacts on costs and mixed to harmful impacts on quality, and that no study found lower costs [22]. The remaining sections examine how the model works, what it does to patients, customers and workers, how it fails, and what governments are now doing about it.
The Arithmetic of Buy-and-Build
Why fragmented local services are the ideal target
A roll-up makes money before it improves anything. The core of the model is multiple arbitrage: small firms sell for low multiples of earnings, large platforms sell for high ones, and combining them creates paper value on day one ◈ Strong Evidence [23]. Debt, sale-leasebacks and deals below the antitrust reporting threshold do the rest.
The arithmetic is simple enough to explain on a single page. Independent practices and small trade businesses typically sell for a low multiple of their annual earnings, because buyers are scarce and the business depends on its owner. A large platform with many sites, central management and a track record sells for a much higher multiple, because institutional buyers will pay for scale. A fund that buys a platform and then adds small firms at low multiples can therefore resell the combined company at the platform's multiple, booking a gain on every add-on even if none of them changes how it operates. Industry explainers illustrate it with a firm earning $3 million bought at six times earnings for $18 million and valued at $36 million at a twelve-times exit [23]. The funeral industry offers real numbers: KFF Health News reported that sale prices for funeral homes rose from three to five times revenue to seven to nine times as consolidators competed for them ✓ Established [19].
Multiple arbitrage explains why the model favours fragmented sectors, but it does not by itself explain the pressure on prices and staff. That comes from how the deals are financed. Private equity funds typically buy companies with a large share of borrowed money, and the debt sits on the acquired company's balance sheet rather than the fund's. Eileen Appelbaum and Rosemary Batt, in a 2020 working paper for the Institute for New Economic Thinking, described the health care buyout model as one designed to extract value quickly in order to service high debt and deliver outsized returns within a short holding period [24]. The Center for Economic and Policy Research, in a study of autism services, found that the average holding period was about four years [25]. A company that must repay its acquisition debt and show rising earnings within four years has few levers available. It can raise prices, increase volume, cut labour costs or sell its property.
The five levers that recur across every sector studied in this report are well documented in the academic and regulatory record:
- Price increases through local market power. Once a platform owns most practices in an area, insurers and customers lose the option to go elsewhere; US Anesthesia Partners charged rates the FTC described as far above the Texas average [26].
- Volume and coding changes. Acquired physician practices billed 9.4% more visits as longer than 30 minutes and saw 38% more new patients [5].
- Labour substitution. Nursing homes and hospitals replace registered nurses with cheaper staff or reduce headcount; hospital-wide staffing fell 11.6% after private equity acquisition [27].
- Sale-leasebacks. The operating company sells its buildings to a property investor, pays the proceeds to its owners and then pays rent; Steward Health Care sold its hospital real estate for $1.2 billion in 2016 and paid a $484 million dividend [28].
- Dividend recapitalisations. The company borrows more money to pay its owners; Prospect Medical's $1.31 billion recapitalisation sent $658.4 million to Leonard Green in dividends and fees [29].
Under US law, mergers below the Hart-Scott-Rodino threshold — about $110 million in 2023 — do not have to be reported to the FTC or the Department of Justice, and non-reportable mergers were about 90% less likely to be investigated [8]. Appelbaum and Batt put the median health care buyout at $60 to $70 million, below that line [24]. A study of more than 4,000 dialysis facility acquisitions found that about half went unreported, and that exempt acquisitions of competing facilities were associated with a 3.6% rise in hospitalisations and a 1.8% fall in survival [30].
The reporting gap is the structural reason the model has spread so widely without challenge. Thomas Wollmann of the University of Chicago, whose work on dialysis clinics first quantified the effect, has described the pattern as stealth consolidation: hundreds of small deals that together produce a concentrated market, none of which crossed the threshold that would have triggered a review [8]. Research published in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis found that deal values cluster just below the threshold, a sign that buyers structure transactions to avoid it [31]. The FTC's 2022 order against JAB Consumer Partners, owner of National Veterinary Associates, was explicit about the concern. Holly Vedova, then director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition, said private equity firms were increasingly using roll-up strategies that allowed them to accrue market power off the Commission's radar ✓ Established [32].
The supply of sellers is the final element. Many local service businesses were founded by people now approaching retirement, and their children often do not want to take over. Project Equity estimates that 2.9 million US businesses owned by baby boomers employ more than 32 million people [33]. Japan faces an even sharper version of the same demographic problem, with about 1.27 million small-business owners aged 70 or older reported to have no successor [34]. For a retiring vet or dentist, a private equity offer is often the only serious bid. Michele Forbes, who owns an independent animal hospital, told PBS NewsHour in 2026 that she had received an offer of $8.5 million for her practice [10]. The sellers are not victims, and the payments are real. But the transaction converts a business run for a lifetime into one run for a four-year exit, and that change in time horizon is what the rest of this report measures.
The multiple-arbitrage gain is booked when the deal closes, not when the business improves. That reverses the usual logic of investment: the fund's return depends less on making the vet practice or the nursing home better than on buying enough of them, borrowing against them and selling the bundle before the costs of that debt and those staffing cuts show up in the data.
The financial engineering also changes who bears risk. In a conventional owner-operated practice, the owner carries the debt and loses if the business fails. In a leveraged roll-up, the fund has typically recovered much of its equity through dividends and sale-leasebacks long before any failure, while the operating company keeps the debt and the rent. The Senate Budget Committee's bipartisan 2025 report on private equity hospitals documented this sequence in detail: Prospect Medical paid $457 million in dividends in 2018, Leonard Green collected about $275 million from the company, and Prospect carried $2.8 billion in liabilities by 2019 [35]. When such a company later fails, the losses fall on staff, suppliers, local governments and patients — the subject of section 5.
What Happened to the Patients
Nursing homes, hospitals and hospices: the strongest evidence
The most rigorous research on private equity concerns care for frail and sick people, and it points in one direction. Nursing home mortality rose about 10% after private equity acquisition ✓ Established [2], hospital-acquired conditions rose 25% [4], and emergency department deaths rose 13% [27]. These are not anecdotes. They are the results of large studies using Medicare data and control groups.
The landmark study is by Atul Gupta, Sabrina Howell, Constantine Yannelis and Abhinav Gupta, first released by the National Bureau of Economic Research in 2021 and published in the Review of Financial Studies in 2024 [3]. Using data on more than 18,000 nursing homes, about 1,700 of which were acquired by private equity, the authors compared patients at acquired homes with similar patients elsewhere [2]. Short-term mortality rose by about 10%, which the authors estimated as more than 20,000 additional deaths over 2004 to 2019, or about 1,000 a year ✓ Established [2]. When they used a method that accounts for which patients choose which home, the effect rose to 11% [3]. The study also found that total staffing fell 1.4%, that hours spent on basic care fell 3% and that the use of antipsychotic drugs — a sedation practice regulators have long tried to reduce — rose 50% [2].
The Gupta, Howell, Yannelis and Gupta study of more than 18,000 US nursing homes estimated more than 20,000 additional deaths over 2004 to 2019 [2]. Taxpayer spending per patient episode rose 11%, inspection scores did not improve, and spending shifted towards monitoring fees, interest and lease payments [36]. The paper was peer-reviewed and published in the Review of Financial Studies in 2024 [3].
The finding on costs matters as much as the finding on deaths. Private equity homes did not become cheaper for taxpayers in exchange for worse care. Medicare spending per episode rose 11%, while money moved from front-line care towards interest payments, lease payments and fees to related companies [36]. A separate study published in JAMA Health Forum in November 2021 examined 302 private equity-acquired nursing homes and 9,632 long-stay residents. It found that avoidable emergency department visits rose 11%, hospitalisations rose 8.7% and Medicare costs rose $1,080 per resident per year ✓ Established [37]. Mark Unruh of Weill Cornell Medicine, a co-author, said the findings indicated that private equity-owned facilities offered lower quality long-term care [37]. About 5% of US nursing homes were private equity-owned at the time [37].
Hospitals show the same pattern. In December 2023, Sneha Kannan, Joseph Bruch and Zirui Song published a study in JAMA comparing 662,095 hospitalisations at 51 private equity-acquired hospitals with more than four million at 259 control hospitals [4]. After acquisition, hospital-acquired conditions rose 25%. Falls rose 27.3%, and central-line bloodstream infections rose 37.7% even though 16.2% fewer central lines were placed [4]. A follow-up study in the Annals of Internal Medicine in September 2025 found that emergency department deaths rose by seven per 10,000 visits, a 13% increase, while emergency department salary spending fell 18% and intensive care salary spending fell 16% [27]. Hospital-wide staff numbers fell 11.6% ✓ Established [27].
Staffing cuts are one of the common strategies used to generate financial returns for the firm and its investors.
— Zirui Song, associate professor of health care policy, Harvard Medical School, September 2025Earlier work had already shown that acquired hospitals earned more. Bruch, Gondi and Song's 2020 study of 204 private equity-acquired hospitals found larger rises in net income, charges and charge-to-cost ratios than at 532 control hospitals, with total charges per inpatient stay up $407 three years after acquisition [38]. Some quality measures improved in that study, a reminder that the effects are not uniform [38]. The later research, with better data on adverse events and staffing, suggests why the financial gains and the clinical harms appear together. Labour is the largest cost in any care setting, and when it is cut faster than demand falls, the remaining staff cannot catch every fall, every infection or every deteriorating patient.
The evidence extends to the end of life. A JAMA study published in November 2024 examined caregiver ratings at 2,676 US hospices. Hospices owned by private equity or publicly traded companies scored lowest on every quality measure, with a mean caregiver score of 79.8, compared with 81.2 at other for-profit hospices and 83.1 at non-profit ones ✓ Established [39]. Private equity hospice acquisitions went from a handful in 2016 to more than 30 in 2021 [40]. Robert Tyler Braun of Weill Cornell, the lead author, said greater ownership transparency would allow regulators and families to make informed decisions [40]. Assisted living, which is less regulated than nursing homes, is following the same path: 252 private equity deals covering 912 facilities between 2006 and 2023, worth $17.3 billion in 2023 dollars, peaking with 36 deals in 2021 [41].
Real-estate investors produce a similar pattern. A 2023 study in Health Affairs found that nursing homes bought by real estate investment trusts increased hours of cheaper licensed practical nurses and nursing assistants while registered nurse staffing fell 6.25% in the second and third years after investment [42]. The authors wrote that such homes may substitute relatively inexpensive care for more expensive registered nurse care [42]. The case of HCR ManorCare, bought by the Carlyle Group in 2007, shows how the two forms of ownership combine. In 2011 Carlyle sold ManorCare's property to HCP in a sale-leaseback that returned its $1.3 billion equity investment to investors; ManorCare then owed $472 million a year in rent, rising 3.5% annually [43]. Health code violations rose about 26% between 2013 and 2017, serious violations rose 29%, and the company filed for bankruptcy in March 2018 [43].
The Price of Fewer Owners
Physicians, anaesthetists, dentists and vets
Outside the care home, the main measurable effect of a roll-up is on price. Private equity-acquired physician practices raised prices per claim 11% ✓ Established [5], anaesthesia prices rose 26% where management companies were private equity-backed [44], and UK large vet groups charged 16.6% more than independents [6]. The mechanism is local market power accumulated one practice at a time.
The best-studied price effect concerns physician specialties. A study by Yashaswini Singh, Zirui Song, Jane Zhu and colleagues, published in JAMA Health Forum in 2022, compared 578 dermatology, gastroenterology and ophthalmology practices acquired by private equity between 2016 and 2020 with 2,874 independent practices [5]. After acquisition, charges per claim rose 20% and the amount insurers actually paid per claim rose 11% ✓ Established [5]. Volume also rose: new-patient visits increased 38% and total visits 16%, while the share of visits billed as lasting more than 30 minutes rose 9.4% [5]. Jane Zhu of Oregon Health and Science University, the senior author, said the billing patterns could reflect more efficient documentation or could mean upcoding or up-charging insurers to make more money [5].
Anaesthesia offers a clearer view of what local market power does. A study by Ambar La Forgia and colleagues in JAMA Internal Medicine in 2022 found that prices rose 26% in markets where anaesthesia management companies were backed by private equity, compared with 12.9% where they were not [44]. The most prominent case is US Anesthesia Partners, created in 2012 by the private equity firm Welsh Carson. In September 2023 the FTC sued both, alleging that USAP had bought more than a dozen large anaesthesia practices in Texas and raised prices, costing Texans tens of millions of dollars a year [26]. According to the complaint, one insurer found USAP's rates 95% above the Texas in-network average, and an internal presentation set out a plan to roll up Houston through tuck-in acquisitions [45].
The FTC's 2023 complaint against Welsh Carson and US Anesthesia Partners described a roll-up of more than a dozen practices that raised prices across the state [26]. Welsh Carson was dismissed from the federal case in 2024 but accepted a consent order in January 2025 limiting its role at USAP and requiring prior FTC approval for future anaesthesia investments nationwide [46]. USAP itself settled with the FTC on confidential terms in April 2026 [47].
Private equity firm Welsh Carson spearheaded a roll-up strategy and created USAP to buy out nearly every large anesthesiology practice in Texas.
— Lina Khan, Chair, US Federal Trade Commission, September 2023Veterinary care has received the most thorough official examination anywhere. In October 2025 the UK Competition and Markets Authority published provisional findings from a market investigation that drew 56,000 responses [6]. It found that average vet prices rose 63% between 2016 and 2023, well above inflation, and that pet owners paid 16.6% more on average at practices owned by large groups than at independents ✓ Established [6]. For at least three of the six large groups, prices rose faster at practices they had acquired than at practices that remained independent [11]. Fewer than half of pet owners knew their practice belonged to a chain, and fewer than 40% of practices published prices online [48]. Martin Coleman, chair of the inquiry, said pet owners were often left in the dark about who owned their practice, about treatment options and about prices [48].
The US picture is similar but less systematically measured. PBS NewsHour reported in July 2026 that US veterinary costs had risen about 60% since 2014, while the corporate share of practices rose from about 10% to an estimated 30 to 50% [10]. Mars, the confectionery company, bought the VCA chain for $9.1 billion in 2017 and now runs about 2,500 clinics, while JAB-owned National Veterinary Associates runs more than 1,400 clinics worldwide [16]. In 2022 the FTC required JAB to sell six clinics when it bought a 16-clinic specialty group and imposed ten-year prior-approval conditions on clinics in California and Texas [32]. Matt Salois of Veterinary Management Groups told PBS that private equity's entry into a practice was in itself neither good nor bad [10]. The data suggest that its effect depends on how much of a local market a single owner controls.
Dentistry shows a subtler effect, through treatment mix rather than headline prices. Dental service organisations — corporate entities that manage practices — employed 13% of US dentists in 2022, up from 8.8% in 2017, and 23% of dentists within ten years of graduation [49]. A 2025 study in Health Services Research by Kamyar Nasseh, Anthony LoSasso, Marko Vujicic and colleagues found that submitted charges rose about 3.3% after private equity acquisition while negotiated prices did not change, but that implant procedures per visit rose 14%, reaching 46% after four years ◈ Strong Evidence [15]. The authors concluded that firms can raise revenue by shifting from preventive to higher-cost restorative procedures [15]. The extreme case is Kool Smiles, a chain serving children on Medicaid: in 2018 its management company Benevis paid $23.9 million to settle allegations that 130 clinics billed for medically unnecessary baby root canals, extractions and crowns, without admitting liability [50].
Home services have no insurer negotiating prices and no regulator inspecting outcomes, which makes them harder to study and easier to monetise. PitchBook recorded 55 private equity HVAC deals in 2024, up 72% [18], and technicians describe a shift towards replacing equipment rather than repairing it [51]. Tony Hyser, a Minnesota plumbing business owner, said the best technicians do not want to be salespeople [18]. Without data, the effect on bills is not yet established, but the incentives are the same as in medicine.
The pattern across these sectors is consistent with economic theory. Where a buyer of services is large and sophisticated, as with commercial insurers, a roll-up raises the negotiated price. Where the buyer is an individual, as with a pet owner or a homeowner, the roll-up raises prices through menus, fees and recommended treatment rather than through negotiation. The CMA found that many UK practices charged £30 or more simply to write a prescription, and that owners could save more than £200 a year by buying medicines elsewhere [48]. Funeral homes show the same effect: after Foundation Partners bought a Tucson funeral home, the price of a direct cremation rose from $425 to $760 [19]. In each case, the customer is buying at a moment of need, without the information or time to compare.
When the Debt Comes Due
Steward, Prospect, Genesis and the town left behind
Private equity-backed companies accounted for 56% of US bankruptcies with more than $500 million in liabilities in 2024, against a footprint of about 6.5% of the economy ✓ Established [52]. In health care, seven of the eight largest bankruptcies that year involved private equity owners [52]. When a leveraged roll-up fails, the fund has usually been paid; the community has not.
The pattern in the bankruptcy data is consistent across years. The Private Equity Stakeholder Project found that private equity-backed firms made up 11% of all US bankruptcies in 2024 but 56% of those with liabilities above $500 million, and that their failures led to at least 65,850 layoffs [52]. In 2025 the share of the largest bankruptcies remained above half: 19 of 35 filings with more than $1 billion in liabilities, or 54% [53]. In the first half of 2026, private equity-backed firms accounted for half of bankruptcies above $1 billion and 15% of all filings above $10 million, against about 7% of the economy [54]. Jim Baker, the group's executive director, said large bankruptcies did not just affect investors; they cost workers their jobs and closed stores that communities depended on ◈ Strong Evidence [53]. The figures come from an advocacy organisation, but they are compiled from public court filings and have not been seriously disputed.
Steward Health Care is the defining case. Cerberus Capital Management bought a group of Catholic hospitals in Massachusetts in 2010 with an investment of $246 million and built Steward into a national chain [55]. In 2016 Steward sold the real estate of its hospitals to Medical Properties Trust in a $1.2 billion sale-leaseback and paid a $484 million dividend to its owners [28]. Cerberus made about $800 million over a decade, and a further $111 million dividend was paid when it exited in 2020 [28]. When Steward filed for bankruptcy in May 2024, it owed more than $9 billion, including $6.6 billion in long-term rent to Medical Properties Trust and about $1 billion in unpaid bills ✓ Established [56]. One year later, five hospitals had closed permanently, two had suspended services and about 2,400 workers had been laid off [56].
The sequence at Steward — acquisition with borrowed money, sale of the property, dividends to the owners, and rent that the hospitals could not afford — repeats across the sector. Prospect Medical Holdings, majority-owned by Leonard Green from 2010 to 2021, filed for bankruptcy in January 2025 with 16 hospitals in California, Connecticut, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island [29]. Its $1.31 billion dividend recapitalisation had sent $658.4 million to Leonard Green in dividends and fees [29]. Genesis Healthcare, one of the largest US nursing home operators, was bought in a $1.7 billion leveraged buyout in 2007, sold 147 of its properties to a real estate investment trust for $2.4 billion in 2011, and filed for bankruptcy in July 2025 with 175 facilities in 18 states [57]. Its unsecured debts of more than $1.5 billion included money owed to workers and suppliers [57].
When a leveraged care operator fails, the fund's equity has often been returned years earlier through dividends and property sales. The losses fall on those who cannot diversify: nurses owed wages, local suppliers owed invoices, residents who must move, and towns that lose their only hospital. Steward left at least 1,300 creditors [55]. Alan Sager of Boston University described the company as the legal and financial equivalent of a Superfund site [55].
Cerberus settled with Steward's creditors in July 2026 for a redacted amount, with the approval of a Houston bankruptcy judge, and was released from future liability [55]. The Senate had already held Steward's former chief executive, Ralph de la Torre, in contempt in September 2024 for refusing to testify [58]. The bipartisan Senate Budget Committee report, led by Sheldon Whitehouse and Chuck Grassley, described the consequences in specific places. Grassley pointed to Ottumwa, Iowa, where reduced services at a private equity-owned hospital forced residents to travel significant distances for care [35]. Whitehouse said private equity had infected the health care system, putting patients, communities and providers at risk ◈ Strong Evidence [35].
The costs of a failure in a local service extend well beyond the balance sheet. The research record identifies at least five forms of damage that persist after a bankruptcy court has closed a case:
- Loss of local capacity. Closed hospitals and care homes are rarely reopened; Steward's five closures and Prospect's closure of Crozer-Chester Medical Center in Pennsylvania removed emergency and inpatient services from their communities [56] [59].
- Lost wages and jobs. Steward laid off about 2,400 workers and Prospect's Pennsylvania closures about 2,650 [56] [59].
- Unpaid local suppliers. Steward left about $1 billion in unpaid bills to vendors and others at the time of filing [56].
- Displaced residents. Nursing home failures put frail residents at risk of moving or of losing staff; Genesis entered bankruptcy with 175 facilities in 18 states [57].
- Public rescue and new rules. Governments step in after the fact: France's state-backed Caisse des Dépôts took control of Orpea, and Massachusetts rewrote its market-review law after Steward [60] [61].
The UK learned these lessons earlier than the United States. Southern Cross, once the country's largest care home operator, was bought by Blackstone in 2004 for about £160 million; Blackstone sold the properties and leased them back with rent rising up to 2.6% a year, floated the company in 2006 and exited [62]. When rents outran income, Southern Cross collapsed in 2011 with more than 750 homes and about 31,000 residents [62]. Four Seasons Health Care, bought by Terra Firma in 2012 for £825 million, entered administration in 2019 with £525 million in debt, about £55 million a year in interest and 322 homes caring for about 17,000 residents [63]. In each case the homes mostly continued under new operators, which is why such failures rarely become national news. The cost appears instead as instability for residents and staff, and as public money spent to keep services open.
Six Countries, One Playbook
How the roll-up travelled from Texas to Tokyo
The roll-up model is now global, and the countries that have looked at it closely have found the same effects. The UK's competition regulator imposed the most detailed remedies yet on a consolidated vet market in 2026 ✓ Established [48], France is examining profit caps for investor-owned laboratory chains [64], and Australia's new merger regime has revealed hundreds of small serial acquisitions [13].
The UK has moved furthest on veterinary care. The CMA's final decision in March 2026 found a market worth more than £6.7 billion, used by 17.2 million households — 60% of the total — that owned pets in 2024 [48]. Its remedies include a cap on prescription fees of £21 for the first item and £12.50 for each additional one, an obligation to display group ownership on practice branding, written estimates for treatment above £500 and a price comparison website [48]. The orders became binding in September 2026, with implementation over three to twelve months [48]. The CMA did not impose general price controls or order any group to sell practices, so the remedies address information and switching rather than ownership itself [48].
The CMA's investigation, drawing on 56,000 responses, found average prices up 63% from 2016 to 2023 and more than 60% of practices owned by six groups [6] [11]. Fewer than half of owners knew their practice was part of a chain, and more than 70% bought medicines from their vet despite possible savings of more than £200 a year [48]. The remedies, final in March 2026, focus on transparency rather than structural break-ups [48].
France's experience differs because its biggest care scandal did not involve a private equity fund. Victor Castanet's book Les Fossoyeurs, published in January 2022 after three years of research and more than 250 witnesses, exposed rationing of care at Orpea, a stock-market-listed operator of care homes [60]. The French state sued for the return of public funds, and in 2023 a consortium led by the state-backed Caisse des Dépôts took 50.2% of the company in a restructuring that cut its debt by about €3.8 billion [60]. Private equity is more visible in French laboratory medicine and imaging. Six financial groups own 67% of community medical laboratories, and the number of laboratory companies fell from about 5,000 in 2008 to about 400 in 2021 [65]. A French public audit found that net profitability after financing costs was often low or unsustainable at the debt-laden laboratory groups owned by funds such as EQT, Ardian and Cinven [64].
The national pictures differ in detail but converge on the same features: a fragmented service, a wave of acquisitions and a regulator that noticed late. In summary, the six countries compared in this section show the following:
- United Kingdom. Six groups own more than 60% of vet practices; prices rose 63% from 2016 to 2023; remedies binding from September 2026 [11] [48].
- France. Six financial groups own 67% of community laboratories, down from about 5,000 laboratory companies to about 400 [65].
- Germany. Investor-owned centres were 30.4% of dental MVZ in 2023; a promised transparency law had no draft by the end of 2025 [66] [67].
- Australia. Mandatory merger notification since January 2026 has exposed serial roll-ups in medical, dental, veterinary and aged care [13].
- Canada. Six companies own about 20% of vet practices after nearly a quarter changed hands in under a decade [12].
- Japan. About 1.27 million owners aged 70 or older lack a successor, making succession the main driver of private equity deals [34].
Germany's debate centres on investor-owned outpatient medical care centres, known as MVZ. Investor-owned centres accounted for 30.4% of all dental MVZ by the third quarter of 2023 [66]. In December 2022 the then health minister, Karl Lauterbach, backed reforms against investors taking over practices in ophthalmology, dentistry and dialysis in order to make profits [66]. The current coalition has promised a law on the transparency of investor ownership, but no draft existed at the end of 2025, and the operators' association rejects the criticism as inflammatory ⚖ Contested [67]. Germany's approach illustrates a common difficulty: the law already restricts who may own a medical practice, but corporate structures allow investors to acquire a hospital or other licensed entity and use it as a vehicle to own outpatient centres.
Australia and Canada show the roll-up in veterinary and dental care. Australia's mandatory merger notification regime, in force since January 2026, has shown medical, dental, veterinary and aged-care deals featuring heavily among filings, many of them private equity roll-ups [13]. Gina Cass-Gottlieb, chair of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, said the regime gave greater visibility on consolidation that could weaken competition [13]. Its three-year cumulative threshold is designed to capture serial acquisitions that would each fall below a single-deal test [68]. In Canada, nearly a quarter of veterinary practices were bought by corporate groups in less than a decade, and six companies now own about 20% of practices [12].
Japan presents the model in its most sympathetic form. With about 1.27 million small-business owners aged 70 or older reported to lack a successor, business succession deals have become a large share of Japanese private equity activity, and acquisitions of small private firms rose from 260 in 2014 to 4,940 in 2024 ◈ Strong Evidence [34]. In care, Bain Capital took Nichii Gakkan, a major nursing care and childcare provider, private in 2020 at a value of ¥121.9 billion, overcoming a rival proposal and opposition from an investor that held out for a higher price [69]. Japan's universal long-term care insurance sets prices centrally, which removes the main lever of price increases seen in the United States. That makes Japan an important test of whether the roll-up produces efficiency where pricing power is limited, or whether the pressure moves to staffing instead.
Every country that has found the roll-up in its data found it late, because merger control was built to review large single deals. The UK needed a full market investigation, Australia a new cumulative threshold, and the United States a rule requiring five years of prior acquisitions — which a court vacated in February 2026 [71]. Where regulators cannot see a series of small deals, they cannot assess them.
The comparison also shows that the harms depend on the payment system. Where prices are set centrally, as in Japan's long-term care insurance or in public reimbursement systems in parts of Europe, roll-ups cannot easily raise prices and tend to seek returns through scale, staffing and property. Where prices are negotiated or set by the provider, as in US commercial insurance or in veterinary and home services everywhere, consolidation translates more directly into higher bills. The UK vet market and the US anaesthesia market are the two clearest examples of the latter. The French laboratory market sits in between: fees are regulated, but groups have used scale to cut costs and to carry debt that a public audit judged unsustainable [64].
The Regulatory Counter-Attack
States act while federal rules are rolled back
Since 2025, US states have passed the first laws directly restricting private equity control of medical practices ✓ Established [70], while federal protections have moved in the opposite direction: the nursing home staffing mandate was repealed in December 2025 [72] and the expanded merger-filing rule was vacated in February 2026 [71].
Oregon passed the most far-reaching law. Senate Bill 951, signed by Governor Tina Kotek in June 2025, bars management services organisations from holding majority ownership of the medical practices they contract with, prevents their staff from serving as directors or officers of those practices and voids most non-compete agreements between management companies and physicians [70]. It applies to new entities from January 2026 and to existing ones from 2029 [70]. California followed with Senate Bill 351, signed in October 2025, which prohibits private equity groups and hedge funds from interfering with clinical judgment or controlling coding, billing and payer contracting at physician and dental practices [73]. Massachusetts, reacting to Steward, passed a law in January 2025 that lets its Health Policy Commission review significant equity investors for up to five years after a deal and bans future sale-leasebacks of acute care hospitals [61].
Other states have chosen disclosure over restriction. Indiana dropped a proposed merger approval board in 2025 and instead required hospitals, insurers and pharmacy benefit managers to report ownership, including private equity interests, from July 2025 [74]. At the federal level, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services finalised a rule in November 2023 requiring nursing homes to disclose whether any owner or manager is a private equity company or a real estate investment trust, including indirect owners [75]. Disclosure rules are cheaper to pass and harder to oppose. Their weakness is that they rely on someone using the information, and the CMA found that UK pet owners rarely knew who owned their vet even when the information existed [48].
Federal policy has become more ambivalent. The April 2024 nursing home staffing rule, which would have required 3.48 hours of nursing care per resident per day and a registered nurse on site around the clock, was struck down by a federal judge in April 2025, paused by statute for ten years in July 2025 and repealed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in December 2025 [72]. Robert F. Kennedy Jr., the health secretary, said the aim was to safeguard access to care by removing federal barriers [72]. In February 2026 a federal court in Texas vacated the FTC's expanded merger-filing rule, which required firms to disclose five years of prior acquisitions — the provision most useful for detecting roll-ups [71]. The FTC under Chairman Andrew Ferguson has appealed and has named health care an enforcement priority [71].
Antitrust enforcement has produced settlements rather than precedents. The FTC's case against US Anesthesia Partners ended in April 2026 with a confidential settlement that the agency said would restore a competitive market structure; the case resumes if USAP fails to comply [47]. Welsh Carson had already accepted an order freezing its USAP investment, reducing it to one non-chair board seat and requiring prior approval for future anaesthesia investments [46]. The 2023 Merger Guidelines, still in force, state that when a merger is part of a series of acquisitions, the agencies may examine the whole series, including earlier deals that were never reported [76]. That principle has not yet been tested in a contested court ruling on a roll-up.
| Policy approach | Effectiveness | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Cumulative merger thresholds | Australia's three-year aggregation and the vacated US five-year rule target the roll-up directly; they work only if sustained in court [13] [71]. | |
| Corporate practice restrictions | Oregon's majority-control ban changes ownership structures rather than outcomes; its effect on prices and quality will not be measurable for several years [70]. | |
| Post-closing review powers | Massachusetts can review investors for five years and ban hospital sale-leasebacks, the mechanism behind Steward's failure [61]. | |
| Ownership disclosure | Federal nursing home and Indiana hospital disclosure rules create data for researchers and regulators but rarely change consumer behaviour [75] [74]. | |
| Price and fee transparency | The UK vet remedies cap prescription fees and require estimates, but leave ownership and local concentration unchanged [48]. |
The table above reflects a judgement about what each approach can achieve, not a measured result, because none of the newer laws has been in force long enough to evaluate. The common weakness of state laws is jurisdiction. A fund that cannot buy practices in Oregon can still buy them in Idaho, and a national platform can concentrate in states without restrictions. The common weakness of disclosure is that it depends on enforcement capacity. The American College of Physicians noted in May 2026 that private equity acquisitions in health care rose 167% between 2010 and 2020 while FTC staffing fell 17% [77]. Jan Carney, president of the college, said there was a fundamental difference between the long-term nature of health care delivery goals and the need for short-term returns on private equity investments [1].
What the Evidence Tells Us
The case for the defence, and what survives it
The defence of private equity in local services is real and partly supported: it brings capital, succession and scale to fragmented sectors, and some studies find improved access ⚖ Contested [78]. But the weight of peer-reviewed evidence — on mortality, prices and bankruptcy — points the other way ◈ Strong Evidence [22]. The problem is less private ownership than leverage, short holding periods and local concentration.
The industry's case is set out by the American Investment Council, the private equity trade body. Its chief executive, Drew Maloney, wrote in 2024 that private equity had invested $15 billion in more than 250 urgent care clinics by 2020, that more than 130 rural hospitals closed between 2010 and 2021, and that doctors spent about 15 hours a week on paperwork that larger organisations can absorb [79]. There is evidence on this side. A Health Affairs study published in May 2026 tracked 225 private equity-acquired primary care practices and found that patient numbers rose 11%, physician numbers 17% and nurse practitioners and physician assistants 40% ⚖ Contested [78]. Yashaswini Singh of Brown University, the lead author, said the study was a reminder that the relationship between private equity and patient care was more complicated [78]. Research on US childcare chains found that private equity centres charged slightly less than other chains, with similar staff ratios but higher staff turnover [80].
The Case for Private Equity
2.9 million US businesses are owned by baby boomers, and many have no buyer except a fund [33].
Funds invested in urgent care and rural services where other capital was absent [79].
Larger groups can absorb billing, compliance and technology costs that burden small practices [79].
Acquired primary care practices added patients, physicians and nurse practitioners [78].
Private equity owns only 3.5% of US acute hospitals, and two-thirds of acquired hospitals were resold within five years [21].
The Case Against
About 10% higher short-term mortality and more than 20,000 additional deaths [2].
Physician practice prices up 11%, anaesthesia up 26% where management firms were private equity-backed [5] [44].
Several claims in this debate remain genuinely contested, and an honest assessment has to state them precisely. Each of the four below has credible evidence on both sides, and each matters for policy, because the case for restricting ownership is strongest where causation is clearest and weakest where the realistic alternative to a sale is closure. The contested points are these:
- Causation in the nursing home research. Critics argue that private equity buys homes that were already declining; the Gupta study compared changes within the same homes before and after acquisition and accounted for patient selection, and the effect grew rather than shrank under the stricter method ⚖ Contested [3].
- Access or billing in primary care. The Brown study measured volume, not health outcomes, and covered only Medicare patients over a short period [78].
- Consolidation or investment in vet prices. The CMA found prices up 63%, well above inflation, and large groups charging more than independents, yet chose transparency remedies over price controls [6] [48].
- Succession as a public good. The argument is strongest in Japan and in rural trades, where the realistic alternative to a sale may be closure rather than independent ownership [34] [33].
The systematic evidence nonetheless points one way. The 2023 BMJ review by Borsa, Bejarano, Ellen and Bruch examined 55 studies. Of 12 studies on costs, nine found higher costs, three found no change and none found lower costs; of 27 studies on quality, 12 found harmful effects, nine mixed effects and three beneficial effects ◈ Strong Evidence [22]. The authors concluded that private equity ownership was often associated with harmful impacts on costs and mixed to harmful impacts on quality [22]. That is a careful conclusion, and it should be read carefully. It does not say every acquisition causes harm. It says that, across settings and methods, the average effect is not the efficiency gain the industry promises.
The strongest harms cluster where three conditions meet: high leverage, short holding periods and local market concentration. A long-term private owner of a vet practice with little debt behaves much like an independent one. A fund that must repay acquisition debt and exit within four years, in a town where it owns most of the practices, faces incentives that the data show it acts on. Regulation aimed at those three conditions is more likely to work than regulation aimed at private equity as a label.
The policy implications follow from that structure. The most effective tools are the ones that address the mechanics rather than the ownership label: cumulative merger thresholds that capture a series of small deals, as in Australia [13]; limits on sale-leasebacks of essential facilities, as in Massachusetts [61]; minimum staffing standards in care settings, which the United States has now abandoned [72]; and ownership disclosure that is visible at the point of sale, as the UK now requires on vet practice branding [48]. None of these prevents a retiring dentist from selling to a fund. Each makes it harder to profit from a roll-up by concentrating a local market, loading it with debt or cutting the staff whose work cannot be seen until something goes wrong.
The final finding concerns time. The roll-up model rewards a fund for what it can show at exit, typically four to five years after purchase, while many of the costs — staff turnover, deferred maintenance, lost trust, the closure of a hospital or care home — arrive later and fall on others. Brendan Ballou, a former federal prosecutor, argued in his 2023 book Plunder that private equity firms can profit from companies even when those companies do not survive [81]. The evidence assembled here does not prove that this is the usual outcome. It does show that the system allows it, that it has happened at scale in nursing homes and hospitals, and that the vet, the dentist and the plumber are now being bought on the same terms. A town in which every practice has the same owner has lost something that no price comparison website can restore: the option to go somewhere else.